

Immigration and Nationalism in the Long Run

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Abstract: We study the long-term effects of immigration on anti-immigrant sentiment and voting for nationalist parties. Drawing on a natural experiment in post-war Germany where the Allied occupation led to a discontinuous and quasi-exogenous distribution of forced migrants in one region, we examine how a large migrant inflow shapes local voting outcomes and electoral reactions to subsequent immigration between 1949 and 2021. Applying a spatial regression discontinuity design and combining historical migration records with panel data at the municipality level, our results reveal a weaker nationalist backlash against present-day immigration where more migrants settled in the late 1940s. To study the mechanisms, we conduct a geocoded survey with experimental elements and open-ended questions in the study region and find that both family history and local collective memory of immigrant integration contribute to explaining these findings.

Keywords: Migration, Nationalism, Persistence, Voting Behavior

JEL-Classification: D72, O15.

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1 Introduction

Inflows of migrants and refugees generally evoke political opposition. In many advanced democracies, voting for nationalist parties with anti-immigrant positions surged during recent immigration waves (e.g., [Cantoni et al., 2019](#); [Dal Bó et al., 2023](#); [Djourelouva, 2023](#)). Several studies document causal effects of exposure to immigration on electoral support for far-right parties ([Dinas et al., 2019](#); [Dustmann et al., 2019](#); [Halla et al., 2017](#); [Steinmayr, 2021](#)). Yet, not all voters respond to immigration by shifting to the right. Quite the opposite, many speak in favor of welcoming and integrating migrants, emphasizing advantages such as economic opportunities and cultural diversity. In this paper, we examine the origins of this heterogeneity in political reactions to migrant inflows. We argue that through long-term experience with immigration, voters learn about its benefits and drawbacks. In particular, fears that immigration hurts the domestic economy are widespread, but a growing literature documents long-term economic benefits of immigration in many contexts ([Beerli et al., 2021](#); [Card, 1990](#); [Foged & Peri, 2015](#); [Peters, 2022](#); [Sequeira et al., 2020](#); [Tabellini, 2020](#)).¹ If voters witness such positive effects in their home region, they may update their beliefs and reduce their political opposition to immigration. As political views persist locally through transmission within families and local communities ([Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007](#); [Alesina et al., 2013](#); [Haffert, 2022](#); [Voigtländer & Voth, 2012](#)), we argue that latent differences in views on immigration can translate into differences in local voting behavior whenever immigration turns politically salient, even decades later. We expect that electoral reactions to new immigration waves will thus be less hostile in regions that have made more experiences with immigration in the past. We test this argument as an explanation for the diverse political reactions to immigration at both the regional and individual level in the context of post-war Germany between 1949 and 2021. We find that local experiences with past immigration reduce contemporary far-right voting and anti-immigrant sentiment. Our findings underscore the relevance of learning from past immigration experiences as key factors for explaining contemporary differences in support for nationalism.

¹In their review of this literature, [Edo et al. \(2019\)](#) conclude: “overall, economic studies indicate that the impact of immigration on the average wage and employment of native-born workers is zero or slightly positive in the medium to long term. However, because adjustments take time, the immediate labour market effects of unexpected migration episodes [...] can be detrimental.”

In general, identifying causal effects of past immigration is challenging because immigrants often sort into areas with attractive economic opportunities, reputations, and pre-existing diaspora networks (e.g., Bracco et al., 2018; Brox & Krieger, 2021; Burchardi et al., 2019; Kleven et al., 2014; Verdugo, 2016). For empirical research, this presents an endogeneity issue, as exposure to immigration in the past may be related to unobserved determinants of voting behavior in the present. To overcome this challenge, our study draws on a natural experiment from post-war Germany. After Nazi Germany had been defeated in World War II, more than ten million people were expelled from the Eastern territories of the German *Reich* and forced to migrate to regions within the borders of the newly created Federal Republic of Germany. However, disagreements among the occupation forces prevented expellees from entering the French occupation zone in Germany’s Southwest between the end of the war in 1945 and 1949. This led to a strong discontinuity in the number of expellees at the newly drawn and short-lived border between the French and the US occupation zone. Just north of the new occupation zone border, expellees increased the population by more than 20%. Our analysis studies the effects of this large inflow of forced migrants on electoral outcomes in the short and long run.

To identify the causal effect of the discontinuity at the border, we employ a spatial fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design (Dell, 2010; Dell & Olken, 2020; Keele & Titiunik, 2015). This approach relies on the quasi-random geographic variation resulting from the newly drawn border, assuming that it is exogenous to other determinants of voting behavior. To ensure this, we focus on the German state of Baden-Württemberg, whose contemporary territory was part of two occupation zones during the 1945–1949 period. Unlike in the rest of Germany, this division did neither correspond to any previous nor to any subsequent administrative state boundaries. Instead, the occupation forces agreed on using the southern boundaries of counties that are passed by a highway as the occupation zone border between the US occupation zone in the north and the French occupation zone in the south. For a period of five years, the municipalities in this culturally and economically homogeneous region found themselves being part of either of the two zones. A series of tests confirms that pre-treatment characteristics of these municipalities are continuous at this border, that municipalities could not sort into either occupation zone, and that subsequent migration flows are not affected by it.

To estimate the political implications of this shock, we compile a large 1925–2021 panel data set at the fine-grained municipality level, the smallest administrative unit in Germany. The state of Baden-Württemberg consists of 1,101 municipalities, with a median [mean] municipality size of about 4,800 [10,000] inhabitants.² The data that we collected are a combination of archival data that we digitized and administrative data from the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg. The length of this panel allows us to study the evolution of nationalist voting for the entire history of the Federal Republic of Germany after the fall of the Nazi regime in 1945. In addition to collecting the universe of votes cast in German federal elections, we gather panel data on economic and demographic outcomes and conduct a geocoded custom survey in the region to study the mechanisms behind our findings.

Our main finding is that experience with immigration in the past reduces voting for nationalist parties in the long run. Initially, we document that the division of the region into two occupation zones led to a difference of more than 12 percentage points in the share of forced migrants in the population of municipalities around the border in 1950. Despite the dissolution of the short-term border more than 70 years ago, we find that the 2021 vote share of far-right parties in the municipalities just north of the former border, where more forced migrants settled after World War II, is 1.7 percentage points smaller than in municipalities just south of the former border. Given that far-right parties received about 10 percent of the votes in the study region in this election, this is a sizeable effect. Studying a long-term panel of German federal election results at the municipality level, we show that this discontinuity emerges primarily in times and in places with higher levels of current immigration. Furthermore, a difference-in-discontinuities design around the European migrant crisis of 2015/16 shows that the sudden increase in migration salience at this time re-activated the discontinuity in voting behavior at the former border. In other words, regions with more exposure to the large-scale wave of forced migrants after World War II are significantly less likely to react to current immigration by voting for nationalist parties than regions with less past exposure. We interpret these findings as evidence that current immigration turns latent but

²As a comparison, the average U.S. county has a median [mean] population of approximately 26,000 [106,000] as of 2022 (<https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2020s-counties-total.html>, last accessed on May 18, 2023).

persistent differences in attitudes toward immigration politically salient. A region’s past experience with immigration reduces its nationalist response to current immigration.

To further examine this finding at the voter level, we then conduct a geocoded custom survey with 3,020 respondents in the study region. We observe a significant discontinuity in expellee descendants among survey respondents at the former occupation zone border, revealing a persistent settlement pattern for people with expellee ancestry more than 70 years after the historical inflow of expellees. We find that individuals with expellee ancestors are substantially more immigration-friendly and less likely to vote for nationalist parties, providing evidence that family history plays a significant role in shaping these attitudes and electoral outcomes. Expellee ancestry accounts for at least 31% of the observed difference in vote shares for nationalist parties at the former border in recent elections. The remainder of the effect size is due to the differential electoral behavior of voters who live in the regions that were exposed to the large inflow of expellees after World War II. Combined with additional survey evidence that these attitudes are transmitted within families across generations, these results highlight that both family history and local collective memory in receiving regions are crucial factors in understanding persistent local differences in anti-immigrant attitudes and nationalist voting. Responses to open-ended survey questions align with this interpretation.

We also provide experimental evidence for our argument. In our survey, we randomly inform half of the respondents about the large inflow of expellees after World War II and find that this information treatment affects answers to immigration-related questions. Treated individuals respond in more immigration-friendly ways and are more likely to state that immigration benefits the economy. This activation effect is particularly effective for people without expellee ancestors, supporting the view that the attitudes of expellee descendants toward immigration are already shaped by their family history and providing further evidence that the historical immigration inflow also affected political views in local native communities.

To test whether the treated respondents’ perception of an economically beneficial effect of the influx of expellees is consistent with the actual statistical records, we return to the municipality-level analysis. Applying the spatial RD to administrative tax data reveals positive long-term (but no short-term) economic effects of the historical inflow of forced migrants on the receiving regions, manifesting itself in higher incomes, higher land values, and higher corporate tax revenues.

This supports the view that experiences with immigration in these regions were positive. Further investigating this channel, we find that the mitigation of nationalist responses to immigration flows, is not a function of higher local incomes *per se* but that it is only observable where higher local incomes result from the historical immigration shock. Moreover, in a number of additional tests we show that other differences between the two occupation zones are unlikely to be behind the persistent differences in political views. Except for a persistently higher population density in treated regions, there is no evidence for other persistent differences in local demographic structures or in views toward the occupying countries.

Our study contributes to three strands of literature. First, by revealing that differences in electoral reactions to contemporary immigration result from experiences with past immigration waves, we add to research studying the political consequences of migration in destination countries. In this literature, a number of recent studies show that, on average, voting for far-right parties and support for anti-immigrant policies increase when voters are exposed to immigration (Dinas et al., 2019; Edo et al., 2019; Halla et al., 2017; Hangartner et al., 2019; Harmon, 2018; Tabellini, 2020). Our results on the average short-term electoral reactions are consistent with these findings but our approach is geared towards examining the heterogeneity behind this average effect. With this emphasis, our analysis provides an explanation for the roots of the differences in the electoral reactions to immigration across regions. Whereas the existing literature has focused on causally identifying the average effect of exposure to current immigration and has noted heterogeneities of the effect between regions (Dustmann et al., 2019; Mayda et al., 2022), our study leverages an exogenous source of heterogeneity across regions to causally identify why the effect differs between them.³ With our empirical focus on expellees, we also contribute to the more specific literature strand on the consequences of *forced* migration (Becker & Ferrara, 2019; Becker et al., 2020).⁴

³Both Dustmann et al. (2019) and Mayda et al. (2022) find that the electoral backlash against immigration is stronger in rural areas. As voters in rural areas often have less experience with past immigration than voters in urban areas, our results may contribute to explaining this finding.

⁴In the existing literature, there are several studies that explore various effects of expellees arriving in Germany after World War II. Braun & Dwenger (2020) and Menon (2020) explore political consequences of forced migration but focus on cross-sectional correlations of initial expellee arrivals and voting behavior. Chevalier et al. (2023) use an IV-strategy to show that many expellees voted for expellee parties in the years after their arrival, leading to a short-term increase in spending on welfare and education at the county-level in the 1950s. Peters (2022) and Ciccone & Nimczik (2022) study the causal effects of expellees on economic outcomes.

Second and more generally, our results speak to the literature on how exposure to immigrants and other minorities can affect hostility towards them. The aforementioned studies on electoral reactions to immigration are consistent with the realistic group conflict theory, which predicts intergroup hostility and competition for scarce resources – like jobs or public spending – under the conditions of a sufficiently large outgroup (Blalock, 1967; Campbell, 1965). In contrast, the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954) suggests that interpersonal contact with outgroups can, in contexts that allow sustained interaction in a cooperative environment, reduce prejudice and anxiety in the ingroup. Recent empirical studies provide empirical support for the contact hypothesis by showing that contact with minorities can affect partisanship (Billings et al., 2021) and reduce racial biases (Schindler & Westcott, 2021). Regarding contact with immigrants, Dinas et al. (2021) show that historical exposure to immigration increases sympathy for refugees when surveys draw parallels between past and present immigration. Steinmayr (2021) studies different types of contact with immigrants and finds that short-term exposure increases hostility and far-right voting while sustained interaction with immigrants decreases it. Our results support the view that short-term and long-term effects differ and add that local exposure to immigration can have long-term hostility-reducing effects that persist locally and are passed through generations. The latter resonates with Bursztyn et al. (2021), who study the US context to show that long-term exposure to Arab-Muslims leads to more altruistic behavior toward that group. Compared to this result, we show that a demonstrably positive economic experience with a single large-scale immigration wave leads to more welcoming attitudes toward *other* groups of immigrants in later immigration waves, even though the immigration episodes differ along various dimensions. Our finding on the positive economic long-term effect of immigration also resonates with and supports recent studies on the local economic effects of immigration (Beerli et al., 2021; Burchardi et al., 2019; Ciccone & Nimczik, 2022; Peters, 2022; Sequeira et al., 2020; Tabellini, 2020).

Third, we contribute to the broader literature on the long-term persistence of political attitudes with a dynamic perspective on local persistence. Several studies have documented the persistence of attitudes, traits, and norms, including trust and mistrust (Becker et al., 2016; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011), anti-Semitism (Voigtländer & Voth, 2012), preferences towards the role of the state in the economy (Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007), gender norms (Alesina et al., 2013), and far-right

support (Haffert, 2022). This literature argues that such attitudes, traits, and norms are transmitted across generations, thereby leading to long-term persistence of differences across regions. Unlike the bulk of this literature, our focus is on the dynamics of persistence over time. Rather than comparing differences across units at single points in time, decades or centuries after the shock, we study how contemporary contexts can activate and mute differences in political norms. The two papers in this literature that are closest to our approach are Ochsner & Roesel (2019) and Cantoni et al. (2019). Congruent with our work, both of them show that differences in norms can be dormant for long periods and (re-)activated by current political events. Ochsner & Roesel (2019) study how the Austrian far-right party FPÖ used Turkish sieges in the 16th and 17th century to strategically activate anti-Turkish sentiment in recent elections. Cantoni et al. (2019) argue that many Germans had latent right-wing political preferences that only turned into observable differences in far-right voting when the national political landscape changed and a new far-right party emerged. Our approach and data differ from these studies as we observe the entire time span before, during, and after the historical shock, allowing us to trace the dynamics of persistence over a seven-decade post-treatment period. While these studies point to activation by the “supply side” of politics our results suggest that current political events can also activate latent differences in the demand side of politics. We find that persistence does not necessarily translate into constant and stable differences in political behavior. Different contemporary contexts can activate, mute, and even reverse the political implications of historical shocks. In addition, we shed light on how political views are transmitted within families and local communities and we provide experimental evidence at the individual level showing how latent differences in political views can be activated. The study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the historical context. Section 3 describes the data that we digitized and collected. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy based on the spatial RD design. Section 5 presents the results on the historical expellee shock (5.1), on its electoral consequences (5.2), and on its role for nationalist reactions to current immigration (5.3). Section 6 studies the mechanisms, presenting the results of the survey (6.1) and on further channels (6.2). Section 7 concludes.

2 Historical Background

The outcome of World War II entailed a redrawing of Germany's boundaries. Compared to the 1939 borders of the German *Reich*, the Federal Republic of Germany lost about 25% of its territory, mainly because its Eastern territories and regions it annexed during the war became part of the Soviet Union, Poland, and the Czech Republic. The ethnic Germans who lived in these regions were subject to expulsions when the war ended.

In total, about 14 million people were expelled from their home region and had to resettle (Kossert, 2008). This caused a massive inflow of forced migrants to Germany within its new borders. By 1950, about a sixth of the population of the newly established Federal Republic of Germany were expellees (Braun & Dwenger, 2020). For the receiving regions, the arrival of this large number of forced migrants presented a substantial challenge. In war-torn Germany, housing was scarce and economic output had collapsed. Among natives, arriving expellees were often met with opposition and prejudice, sometimes with xenophobia and racism (Klussmann, 2018).⁵ Even though expellees were ethnic Germans and spoke the same language as the native population, historians report that many forced migrants experienced “exclusion and rejection as unwanted foreigners” (Kossert, 2008, p. 12) and describe a “competition” between them and natives with “features of a struggle between nationalities and classes” (Bade, 1994, p. 45). Differences in dialects, denominations, and customs contributed to animosities between natives and expellees (Burchardt, 2001; Kossert, 2008).

In retrospect however, the integration of the expellees was generally portrayed as a success story. For the German post-war economy, they constituted a flexible workforce that took low-paying jobs in a period when the country was rebuilding its economic structures and when new industries were emerging. Historians report that expellees thereby played a significant role in Germany's post-war economic boom (*Wirtschaftswunder*) in the 1950s (Kossert, 2016; Wiederschein, 2016). While fast integration is considered a post-war myth (Lüttinger, 1986), the positive experience of the expellees' labor market absorption may have been a reason for the ex-post glorification of their integration in society (Borutta & Jansen, 2016; Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2018).

⁵Hostility towards expellees went as far as outright insults as “refugee pigs” and open discrimination by the native population. In some cases, allied forces made way for expellees at gunpoint (Wiederschein, 2016)

The number of expellees varied strongly across regions within the new German borders. Overall, factors such as war destruction, population density, geographic location, and supply conditions played a role in the allocation of expellees (Braun & Dwenger, 2020; Peters, 2022). However, a newly drawn internal border between the occupation zones of the French and US occupation forces led to an additional source of variation in the distribution of expellees in the German Southwest. France had not been part of the negotiations on Germany’s post-war occupation in Potsdam and Yalta but requested to occupy a part of Germany after the war (see Mosely, 1950, for details on these negotiations). The Soviet Union only agreed to France as an additional occupying force under the condition that the French zone was constructed out of a fraction of the hitherto designated British and US occupation zones. For logistic reasons, the US military insisted on keeping the highway from Karlsruhe to Munich (*Autobahn A8*) in their zone. Disregarding local circumstances, it only ceded the areas to the southwest of this highway to France (Schumann, 2014).




Figure 1: Occupation Zone Border and Historical Provinces

The map shows the state of Baden-Württemberg that has existed in this form since 1952. It also shows the historical regions of Württemberg (blue), Baden (light green), and Hohenzollern lands (yellow), that existed until 1945. The bold black line is the occupation zone border which split these regions into a part belonging to the US zone in the north and a part belonging to the French zone in the south between 1945 and 1949. The dashed dark-blue line depicts the highway.

Figure 1 shows the border of the occupation zones in the German Southwest. It did not resemble any previous historical borders of the former provinces Baden, Württemberg, and Hohenzollern Lands. Hence, the former occupation zone border within today’s state of Baden-Württemberg, unlike in the rest of Germany, does not follow any historical or contemporary state borders. As an administrative boundary, it only existed for the short period between the fall of Nazi-Germany (1945) and the establishment of the state of Baden-Württemberg in 1952 as part of the Federal Republic of Germany.⁶

The drawing of the occupation zone border had crucial consequences for the expellee distribution because France refused to accept expellees in its zone (Schumann, 2014; Wyrwich, 2020). The French government did not feel obliged by the agreements about accepting expellees at the Potsdam conference, because it had not taken part in it. Only refugees that arrived prior to July 1945 were allowed to stay (Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2018).⁷ The policy remained in place until the end of the occupation regime in 1949. After the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in May 1949, free movement across occupation zone borders was reinstated (Schumann, 2014).⁸

3 Data

For our main analysis, we compile a large 1949–2021 panel data set at the municipality level, the smallest administrative unit in Germany. The average municipality in Baden-Württemberg has a median population size of 4,800 and is thus an order of magnitude smaller than the average US county (with a median population size of 26,000), the geographic unit typically considered in related research in the US context (Bursztyń et al., 2021; Sequeira et al., 2020).⁹ The effects we identify are thus substantially more local than in comparable analyses in the literature. In total, we use data for more than 15,000 municipality-election-year observations.

⁶Between the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 and the state of Baden-Württemberg in 1952, the northern part temporarily formed the German state of Württemberg-Baden, while the southern part formed the states of Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern.

⁷Other than that, the only exception to the French expellee embargo during the occupation was the acceptance of 36,000 German refugees from Denmark in 1947 (Mix, 2005).

⁸Schumann (2014) studies the persistence of population density for this spatial discontinuity in Baden-Württemberg for the 1950–1970 period. In a recent working paper, Ciccone & Nimczik (2022) study economic effects of this discontinuous distribution of expellees.

⁹See <https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2020s-counties-total.html>, last accessed on May 18, 2023.

3.1 Historical Expellee Shock

We digitize data on the number of expellees from historical statistical volumes for the state of Baden-Württemberg, recording the share of expellees in each municipality in 1950, the time of the first census in the Federal Republic of Germany. Figure 2 illustrates the geographic distribution of expellees across municipalities. The discontinuity at the border of the two former occupation zones is evident in the raw data. In our sample, the municipality share of expellees averages 9.51% in the French zone and 20.74% in the US zone, where the maximum is at 45.16%.¹⁰




Figure 2: **Distribution of Expellees in Baden-Württemberg**

The map shows the share of expellees in today's state of Baden-Württemberg as a percentage of the total population in 1950. It visualizes the data on the municipality level that we digitized for all municipalities within 60 km distance to the border.

¹⁰As there have been administrative reforms in the 1970s that reduced the number of municipalities in Baden-Württemberg, we collect the location of the historical municipalities in latitude-longitude space and match the number of expellees and inhabitants to the respective current municipalities using geographic information system (GIS) software. Shapefiles for current municipalities are from *Landesamt für Geoinformation und Landentwicklung*, downloaded January 10, 2020. We collect latitude-longitude records for the old municipalities via the *Nominatim* search engine in December 2020 and June 2021 and verified the locations manually.

3.2 Electoral Outcomes

We study the outcomes of all 20 German federal elections between the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 and 2021, examining all votes cast in Baden-Württemberg at the municipality level.¹¹ Our focus is on votes for far-right, nationalist parties. In Germany, this party family holds strong anti-immigration positions. After the fall of Nazi-Germany and the dissolution of Hitler’s *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (NSDAP), different nationalist parties with far-right positions competed in federal elections; the most prominent ones are *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (NPD) since the 1960s, *Die Republikaner* (REP) in the 1990s and 2000s, and *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) since the 2010s. Based on a number of official sources and contributions to the political-science literature, we identify all far-right nationalist parties that ever participated in the German federal elections. In addition to the three major far-right parties (AfD, REP, NPD), 18 fringe parties fall into this category.¹² We sum up the vote share of these parties in each municipality as our main outcome variable.

In addition, we define the party category of *Expellee Parties*. In the early elections of the Federal Republic, a number of parties represented the particular interests of expellees. Over time, some of them formed various alliances and cooperated and we thus group them together for the analysis.¹³ We also use the vote shares of the other major German parties as outcome variables: the Christian conservative *CDU*, the social democratic *SPD*, the liberal *FDP*, the Green party *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*, and the left socialist party *DIE LINKE*. As they all belong to different party families, we do not group them together. To run pre-treatment placebo-tests, we also make use

¹¹To obtain the results from the 1949 and 1953 elections, we digitized election results from statistical yearbooks of the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg. For all other elections, we received the results from the state’s statistical office.

¹²We code each party as far-right nationalist if at least one of the sources unambiguously uses the terms “extreme right”, “far-right”, “right-wing populist”, or “nationalist” to describe the party (see Appendix A.3 for details). This yields a total of 21 parties. Many of these are small fringe parties that participated in only a small number of elections and received a very minor number of votes. These parties received on average less than 1% of the vote share in Baden-Württemberg in elections in which they competed. In the following, we list them in alphabetical order: *Ab jetzt... Demokratie durch Volksabstimmung*, *Arminius-Bund*, *Bund freier Bürger*, *Christliche Mitte – Für ein Deutschland nach Gottes Geboten* (CM), *Dachverband der nationalen Sammlung* (DNS), *Der III. Weg*, *Deutsche Gemeinschaft* (DG), *Deutsche Reichspartei* (DRP), *Deutsche Liga für Volk und Heimat*, *Deutsche Reichspartei* (DRP), *Deutsche Soziale Union* (DSU), *Deutsche Volksunion* (DVU), *Die Rechte*, *Freiheitliche Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (FAP), *Bürgerbewegung pro Deutschland*, *Bürgerbewegung pro NRW*, *Partei Rechtstaatlicher Offensive* (Schill), *STATT Partei – Die Unabhängigen*.

¹³The parties’ names are *Vertriebenenorganisation Notgemeinschaft Württemberg-Baden*, *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* (BHE), *Gesamtdeutscher Block/Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* (GB/BHE), *Gesamtdeutsche Partei* (GDP), *Deutsche Partei* (DP).

of data on the vote share of Hitler’s nationalist-socialist party *NSDAP*, available for a subset of municipalities in the 1930s.

3.3 Contemporary Immigration

We add panel data on current immigration. The Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg provides annual data on immigration at the state-, county-, and municipality-level. These data go back to the 1970s.¹⁴ We define the variables *Immigration (State)* as the change in the share of foreigners in Baden-Württemberg since the last federal election. Analogously, *Immigration (County)* and *Immigration (Municipality)* denote the change in the share of foreigners at the county and municipality level.




Figure 3: **Immigration to Baden-Württemberg**

The blue line represents the share of people who report they perceive “immigration” as the currently most important issue in Germany. Dots on this curve indicate federal election years. The green and orange bars depict current immigration to Baden-Württemberg as the difference in the population share of migrants to the previous election year. Systematic and reliable immigration data are available since 1970.

Figure 3 visualizes the history of immigration to Baden-Württemberg between the 1970s and today. As we use current immigration levels as a measure for the political salience of immigration, the figure shows *Immigration (State)* values for the 1976–2021 period in concert with data from

¹⁴See <https://www.statistik-bw.de/BevoelkGebiet/MigrNation/01035010.tab?R=LA>, accessed and downloaded last on April 16, 2021.

German election surveys. We plot the share of respondents in Baden-Württemberg who state that “immigration” is “currently the most important issue in Germany.”¹⁵ As is visible, this share is highly correlated with net immigration. Both measures of immigration salience peak in the early 1990s, when many immigrants from Yugoslavia, Turkey, and the Soviet Union arrived in Germany, and in the mid-2010s, the height of the European refugee crisis with an influx of many immigrants from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

3.4 Other Municipality-Level Data

We also collect data on various economic and demographic statistics at the municipality-year level. These include data on local tax revenues (from income taxes, land taxes, corporate taxes), household income, age structure, gender identities, religious affiliations, and population density. We digitized data for the 1950–1990 period from various statistical yearbooks found in archives. Data for the 1990–2021 period are a combination of web-scraped data and administrative data files that we received from the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg. For all municipalities, we also code multiple variables that indicate their geographic location, their distance to the state capital, to the nearest city, etc.

3.5 Custom Survey

To complement the main analysis and to study mechanisms, we fielded a custom survey. In cooperation with the survey company *Bilendi*, we collected data from 3,020 survey respondents in the study region of Baden-Württemberg. We designed the questionnaire to collect information on respondents’ expellee ancestry, family history, political attitudes, views on immigration, and a number of socio-economic and personal characteristics. The survey included randomized elements that we use to experimentally test our claim that memories of past immigration waves can activate latent differences in attitudes toward immigrants. Section 6 describes this experimental approach in more detail. In addition to measuring *stated preferences*, we also extract *revealed preferences* by giving respondents the opportunity to donate a lottery win to an organization that helps forced

¹⁵The survey data are from *Forschungsgruppe Wahlen: Politbarometer*. The number of survey participants in Baden-Württemberg per year ranges between 1,600 and 3,700 (the mean is 2,353). The original German question text is: “Was ist Ihrer Meinung nach gegenwärtig das wichtigste Problem in Deutschland?”

migrants. In addition to *closed-ended questions*, we included an *open-ended question* to study views on the mechanism in respondents' own words. Appendix A.9.1 presents the full questionnaire.

3.6 Summary Statistics

Appendix A.2 provides summary statistics for all variables used in the municipality-analysis and Appendix A.3 describes the coding of these variables in detail. Appendix A.9 provides summary statistics and variable descriptions of the survey data.

4 Empirical Strategy

We study the effect of a massive inflow of forced migrants on local voting behavior over more than seven decades. Our focus is on how this relationship evolves from the short to the long run and how it depends on current levels of immigration.

4.1 Identification

Studying the political and socio-economic effects of immigration requires addressing endogeneity issues that are immanent to the topic of immigration: immigrants typically self-select into locations based on local factors such as pre-existing immigrant communities, a region's reputation, economic conditions as well as the social and political environment. Our approach solves these endogeneity problems by using a quasi-random component in the initial spatial distribution within the largest wave of forced migrants in modern German history. This exogenous variation of the immigration shock between treated and comparable control municipalities allows us to isolate the effect of experience with large-scale immigration in the past. Our estimations compare these municipalities applying a spatial regression discontinuity design over more than seven decades. Our design is tailored to studying how the massive inflow of forced migrants in 1945 affects political behavior in these municipalities in the short and long run and how contemporary political events activate and mute the effects.¹⁶

¹⁶Our approach and the research question we answer differ from the literature applying shift-share-IV strategies to isolate exogenous variation in immigration across regions (e.g., Altonji & Card, 1991; Barone et al., 2016; Burchardi et al., 2019; Bursztyn et al., 2021; Halla et al., 2017; Tabellini, 2020). These studies typically use

Absence of Pre-treatment Discontinuities. In order to use the spatial discontinuity described in section 2 for causal identification, a number of assumptions have to hold. First, there must not be any pre-treatment discontinuities at the border. This assumption is unlikely to be violated in this setting because the border was drawn in 1945 and did not follow any politically important pre-existing administrative boundaries. Rather than following existing state borders – like occupation zone borders in the remainder of Germany – it cut across the existing states of *Baden* and *Württemberg* (see Figure 1). Logistical considerations of the US military led to this quasi-random drawing of the border through politically, socially, and socio-economically homogeneous areas (see previous section). In Figure 4, we show the absence of pre-treatment differences along the border in several observable pre-treatment characteristics. The results of these placebo-regressions confirm that pre-treatment characteristics such as population size and population density in 1939 (and in 1950 when excluding expellees), distance to the nearest city, shares of employed and unemployed in 1933, as well as the population shares of jews and protestants in 1925 balance on both sides of the cut-off created by the occupation zone border. Furthermore, when studying the results from federal elections in 1928, 1930, and 1933, there is no discontinuous pattern in turnout and the vote share of Hitler’s NSDAP at the cut-off.¹⁷

Absence of Sorting. A second important assumption in RD designs is the absence of sorting. In our setting, this requires us to assume that municipalities could not select themselves into one of the two occupation zones. This assumption holds because the border was drawn by the occupation forces following the rule to use the southern borders of all counties crossed by highway A8. Historical maps show that this rule was adhered to without a single exception (see Appendix Figure A1). In Appendix Figure A3, we also show the result of a formal manipulation test based on local polynomial density estimators (Cattaneo et al., 2020). The density of municipalities is not significantly different on the two sides of the border.

Absence of Subsequent Treatments. Since we focus on long-term effects we also need to assume that there was no subsequent treatment along the same border after the expellees were discontin-

interactions of national-level immigrant inflows with immigrants’ past geographic distribution as instruments for county-level immigration. Whereas these studies exploit initial distributions of immigrants to examine effects of gradual variation of immigration across regions, we are interested in the long-term effect of the experience with the initial large-scale arrival of forced migrants.

¹⁷The election results refer to the *Reichstagswahlen* in May 1928, September 1930, and March 1933.




Figure 4: Pre-Treatment Placebos

This figure displays RD plots for the expellee distribution in 1950 in orange and placebo tests for differences in pre-treatment municipality characteristics in blue. The figure uses the occupation zone border as the cut-off and *Distance to Border* as the running variable. Dots display binned averages of the dependent variable indicated in the respective panel title. The lines represent sharp RD estimations using a linear fit with their respective 95% confidence intervals.

uously distributed. This assumption is plausible because the occupation zone border was removed when the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 1949. In 1952, the three states of Baden, Württemberg-Baden, and Württemberg-Hohenzollern, which the occupation forces had founded in 1945 and which had shared the occupation zone border in the 1945–1952 period were merged and combined to the state of Baden-Württemberg. Since then, Baden-Württemberg has comprised the former border and the surrounding municipalities in its entirety. The state has remained in this shape until the end of the observation period (2022) and is the only area state of the Federal Republic of Germany that was divided into two large occupation zones.¹⁸ Subnational, state-level policies have thus not differed between the regions along the former border after 1952. Not even the next lower administrative units, the governorates (*Regierungsbezirke*), follow this former border.

Compound Treatment. While it is thus plausible to rule out other spatial discontinuities before 1945 and after 1952, there may have been other differences between the French and the US occupation zone in addition to the intake of forced migrants in the 1945–1952 period. It is worth noting that the discontinuity in the share of forced migrants naturally coincides with a discontinuity in population density because the inflow of migrants was large. This is why the empirical strategy does not allow isolating the effect of immigration from the effect of population density. Furthermore, although the Allied Control Council (*Alliiertes Kontrollrat*) coordinated policies across the occupation zones in Germany, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that French and US occupation forces differed in how they implemented these common policies. This implies the caveat that our empirical strategy identifies the combined causal effect of both the arrival of forced migrants and any such potential differences between the French and the US occupation zone in this time period. As historians generally emphasize coordination and similarities between the three Western occupation forces until they combined their territories to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 (cf. Pünder, 1966), we assume that the long-run implications of any such temporary differences will be subtle compared to the massive inflow of forced migrants that increased the population in the US zone by more than 20%. In spite of this limitation, the state of Baden-Württemberg constitutes

¹⁸To be precise, there was one exception. The Bavarian county of *Lindau* was part of the French occupation zone in order to provide France with a connection to the territories they occupied in Austria. The rest of Bavaria was occupied by the United States. The city state of Berlin was famously divided into four occupation zones.

a natural laboratory that is well-suited to examine the short- and long-run consequences of the massive inflow of forced migrants after World War II.

4.2 Econometric Specification

To estimate the long run effects of the large-scale migrant inflow, we run spatial fuzzy-RD specifications of the following form:¹⁹

$$expellees_m = \alpha zone_m + f(dist_m, zone_m) + g(long_m, lat_m) + \sum_{s=1}^5 seg_m^s + \epsilon_m \quad (1)$$

$$y_m^t = \beta \widehat{expellees}_m + f(dist_m, zone_m) + g(long_m, lat_m) + \sum_{s=1}^5 seg_m^s + \epsilon_m^t \quad (2)$$

The first-stage equation (1) estimates the extent to which the occupation zone border implied a discontinuity in the share of expellees in the population of municipalities m around the border in the year 1950. The second-stage equation (2) uses the instrumented share of *expellees* to explain variation in outcome variables y measured in year t . Our main outcome variable is the cumulative vote share of far-right parties but we extend the analysis to all parties and party families that ever achieved a significant vote share in German federal elections and to various socio-economic outcomes. The post-treatment period that we study ranges from 1949 to 2022 and includes all 20 federal elections that have been held in the Federal Republic of Germany until the time of writing.

In these models, *US Zone* (*zone*) is an indicator taking the value of 1 if the territory of the municipality was in the US occupation zone, and 0 if it was in the French zone. To locate the municipalities in either of the two occupation zones, we use the coordinates of the occupation zone border from [Schumann \(2014\)](#). Functions $f(\cdot)$ and $g(\cdot)$ are the RD polynomials. *Distance to Border* (*dist*) indicates the geographic distance between the municipality’s centroid and the former occupation zone border (in km). We assign positive values to municipalities that belonged to the former US zone and negative distances to municipalities in the former French zone. In the baseline, $f(dist_m, zone_m)$ is a local linear RD polynomial that is estimated separately in both zones. Robustness tests in [Appendix A.5.5](#) use a second-order polynomial but following [Gelman](#)

¹⁹For robustness, we also run reduced-form analyses in the form of a sharp RD. See [Appendix A.5.1](#).

& Imbens (2019), we refrain from using higher-order polynomials. The function $g(long_m, lat_m)$ is a two-dimensional RD polynomial that controls for smooth functions of longitude and latitude of the municipality’s centroid. It is linear in the baseline and quadratic in robustness tests (Appendix A.5.5). To ensure that we compare proximate observations along the occupation zone border, which has a length of more than 150 km, we follow Dell (2010) and Dell & Olken (2020) by dividing the border into several segments of equal length (five in the baseline) and add these segment fixed effects (*seg*) to the regression.²⁰

RD Bandwidth. Our panel data set builds on the $N = 1,101$ municipalities in Baden-Württemberg and includes data of the time period between 1925 and 2021. As we focus on the municipalities around the former occupation zone border we collected complete data for all 759 municipalities within 60 km distance to the border. In the baseline, we follow the related literature on spatial RD designs and choose an RD bandwidth of 30 km (cf. Dell, 2010; Dell & Olken, 2020; Ochsner & Roesel, 2019, for related models using similar standard bandwidths). We also show that the results hold for both smaller and larger bandwidths (see Appendix A.5.2).

RD Kernel. In the baseline, we assign equal weight to all observations by using a uniform RD kernel in the baseline as the distribution of expellees on both sides of the border is close to uniform (see Figure 4). In Appendix A.5.3, we show that the results are robust to using a triangular kernel, which assigns more weight to observations near the border.

Control Variables. In the baseline, we do not add any control variables to avoid specification choices. Robustness regressions include additional control variables to address concerns of potentially omitted factors (Appendix A.5.4). The control variables in these regressions are smooth functions of each municipality’s distances to the state capital Stuttgart, to the next major city, as well as the highway that influenced the border definition.

Placebo Border. In addition, for Table A9 and Figure A14, we construct a placebo border that uses the northern – rather than the original southern – boundaries of the counties through which

²⁰It is evident from Figure 2 that the distribution of expellees is not homogenous along the occupation zone boundary. The share of expellees is somewhat larger in the east. Segment fixed effects and the smooth functions of the longitude-latitude space control for this.

the highway runs. The placebo tests produce a series of statistically insignificant estimates for key outcome variables.

Sample. In the baseline, we use all municipalities within the RD bandwidth. In Appendix A.5.7 we also show that results are robust to excluding all municipalities that are close to the highway. As Baden-Württemberg consists of many small municipalities and few large ones, we address concerns that large municipalities may be atypical observations. In Appendix A.5.7 we thus show that results are robust to excluding cities with more than 50,000 or 100,000 inhabitants.

Standard Errors. In the baseline, we use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors while in specifications that include multiple years, we cluster standard errors at the municipality level. Appendix A.5.6 shows that results are very similar when using standard errors that are robust to clustering at the county level, to autocorrelation, and to correlations in the spatial dimension using Bartlett kernels (Colella et al., 2019).

5 Main Results

We begin by estimating the discontinuity in the distribution of forced migrants at the occupation zone border as of 1950 in section 5.1. We then estimate the long-term political effect of this historical immigration wave in section 5.2, and examine how current immigration waves activate it in section 5.3. Section 5.4 extends the analysis to all major parties and all federal elections in Germany between 1949 and 2021. In Section 6 we turn to the mechanisms driving these effects.

5.1 The Historical Expellee Shock

In the first step of the empirical analysis, we use the RD model, specified in equation 1, to estimate the discontinuity in the share of expellees at the border. Panel A of Table 1 reports the results of sharp spatial RD regressions of each municipality’s share of expellees in 1950 on the *US Zone* indicator. The results point to a strong discontinuity, statistically different from zero at the 0.1% level, at the border. In 1950, the share of expellees in municipalities just north of the occupation zone border was 12-13 percentage points larger than in neighboring municipalities just south of

the border. The size of the estimated effect is stable across different specifications of the RD model, and thus not sensitive to modelling choices such as adding and removing polynomials of the municipalities' distance to the border, the latitude-longitude space and border-segment fixed effects. The estimated discontinuity is similar to the raw difference in means in the two occupation zones. The mean expellee share in the US zone is 20.9 ($SD = 5.9$), while the mean in the French zone is 9.6 ($SD = 3.9$), when considering all municipalities whose centroid is closer than 30 km to the border.

Table 1: **Expellee Distribution and Long-Term Political Effects**

Panel A: Expellees in 1950 (Sharp RD, First Stage)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>US Zone</i>	12.968*** (0.930)	12.528*** (0.805)	12.518*** (0.835)	12.077*** (0.804)	12.169*** (0.826)
Panel B: Far-Right Vote Share in 2021 (Sharp RD, Reduced Form)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>US Zone</i>	-1.762*** (0.420)	-1.817*** (0.395)	-1.725*** (0.418)	-1.625*** (0.435)	-1.774*** (0.451)
Panel C: Far-Right Vote Share in 2021 (Fuzzy RD, Second Stage)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.136*** (0.033)	-0.145*** (0.033)	-0.138*** (0.034)	-0.135*** (0.036)	-0.146*** (0.038)
Observations	185 + 219	185 + 219	185 + 219	185 + 219	185 + 219
Distance Polynomials	✓		✓	✓	✓
Coordinates		✓	✓		✓
Segments				✓	✓

The table displays coefficients from 15 spatial RD regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The outcome variable is the share of expellees per municipality in 1950. 'Observations' reports the number of observations on each side of the cut-off. 'Bandwidth' depicts the sample bandwidth (in km). 'Distance Polynomials' indicate that local linear polynomials of the running variable *Distance to Border* are included. 'Coordinates' denotes additional inclusion of a two dimensional RD polynomial that is linear in latitude and longitude. 'Segments' indicates the usage of segment fixed effects. Model 5, which controls for distance to the border, latitude-longitude, and segment fixed effects represents the baseline specification for the following analysis. All estimations use a uniform RD kernel. See equation 1 for details. Figure 4 visualizes the discontinuity by means of an RD plot. It shows the sharp increase in the share of expellees once the occupation zone border is crossed from the French zone (negative distances) to the US zone (positive distances). This visualization corresponds to model 1 of Table 1.




Figure 5: **Sharp RD: Effects on Far-Right Voting, 2021**

This figure displays estimates from a sharp RD estimation using the occupation zone border as the cut-off and *Distance to Border* as the running variable. The dependent variable is the vote share of far-right parties in the 2021 election. The dark blue dots display binned means of the dependent variable. The fitted lines represent parametric RD estimations using linear polynomials. The light blue area displays 95% confidence intervals.

5.2 Long-Term Political Effects

What are the long-term political implications of this historical immigration shock for voting behavior in contemporary Germany? We begin by studying its effect on electoral support for far-right, nationalist parties in the most recent German federal election of 2021.

We first estimate this effect with the same sharp spatial RD regressions as before and report the results in Panel B of Table 1. The estimates point to a negative effect on the vote share of far-right parties of 1.6-1.8 percentage points. As far-right parties received about 10 percent of the votes in this region in the federal election of 2021, this is a sizeable effect, corresponding to a sixth of the votes for far-right parties in this region. The coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level across all five specifications. In Panel C of Table 1, we estimate the effect of the historical expellee shock on far-right voting in 2021 with fuzzy spatial RD regressions that use the border as an instrument for the 1950 share of expellees (equation 3). The estimates imply that an increase in the 1950 expellee share by one percentage point reduces the vote share of the far-right AfD in 2021 by somewhat more than 0.1 percentage points.

In Figure 5, we visualize the discontinuity in the municipality-level vote share of far-right parties at the historical occupation zone border using a simple RD plot. The result confirms the substantial drop in the far-right vote share in the municipalities that were exposed to the large expellee inflow after World War II. The remainder of this study aims to elucidate this finding. Why and under what conditions does the large inflow of forced migrants after World War II affect voting for nationalist parties in contemporary Germany?

5.3 Activation by Current Immigration

In a nutshell, the explanation that we test is that experiences with past immigration may in the long run, through an updating of beliefs on its implications, lead to more positive attitudes towards immigration. These more positive attitudes persist locally through transmission of values within families and local communities and affect voting behavior if immigration becomes politically salient in the present. More specifically, we follow existing research in expecting electoral backlashes against contemporary immigration in the short run (e.g., [Dustmann et al., 2019](#); [Steinmayr, 2021](#)). But we expect such hostile electoral reactions to be weaker in areas that have made more experiences with immigration in the more distant past.

Germany has witnessed such anti-immigration backlashes in its recent history. Immigration waves from Yugoslavia and Turkey in the 1990s coincided with increased electoral support for far-right parties like *Die Republikaner* (see Appendix Figure A17). More recently, the entrance of the far-right AfD to German parliaments coincided with the exceptionally large inflow of refugees in the context of the 2015-16 European migrant crisis. [Stecker & Debus \(2019\)](#) show that the AfD gained more votes in areas with more exposure to refugees in this period. In Table A10 in the Appendix, we replicate this finding for our study region. With municipality-level panel data for the 1976-2021 period and two-way fixed effects regressions, we find strong positive associations between contemporary local immigration and vote shares of far-right parties.

In the following, we test several observable implications of this explanation. We begin by examining whether the electoral backlash against a recent immigration wave to Germany was indeed weaker in areas that have made more experiences with immigration in the past.

5.3.1 The European Migrant Crisis: Evidence from Difference-in-Discontinuities

For this exercise, we first zoom in on the European migrant crisis. Immigration to Germany and to the study region of Baden-Württemberg had been at very low levels in the 2000s and early 2010s. The European migrant crisis suddenly changed this in 2015. In this year, more than 1.3 million refugees and migrants came to Europe to request asylum. The largest share of migrants were Syrians, Afghans, and Iraqis, who fled their home countries because of ongoing civil wars. Of all European countries, Germany experienced the largest inflow of migrants with about 500,000 asylum seekers in 2015 and 750,000 in 2016. During this period, far-right parties in Germany – predominantly the *Alternative für Deutschland* – ran on a decidedly anti-immigration platform and gained an increasing share of votes in state and federal elections.²¹

We study the period before and after the start of the crisis to see whether this sudden increase in the salience of immigration had implications for the electoral effect of the historical migrant inflow. Figure 6 plots the results. The vertical bars indicate the yearly share of survey respondents in the region for whom immigration is the most important issue in German politics, confirming the jump in immigration salience in 2015. The plotted dots are RD coefficients indicating the effect of historical expellee exposure on far-right vote shares in election year t estimated by separate fuzzy RD regressions. In addition to federal elections, we consider state-level and EU-level election results to compile a panel with a higher frequency of elections ($T = 12$) in the 2005-2021 period before and after the start of the European migrant crisis. In a sense, this represents a “difference-in-discontinuities” design – a combination of a regression-discontinuity and a difference-in-differences design – that allows examining differences between treated and untreated regions before and after the external shock.

The results show that there are no consistent discontinuities in far-right voting in the period preceding the European migrant crisis (2005–2014). By contrast, there is a negative effect in all five elections of the post-2015 period. All RD estimates of the post-treatment period are statistically significant with p -values of 0.017 and smaller.

²¹See [Cantoni et al. \(2019\)](#) for details on the party’s anti-immigration position since the European migrant crisis.




Figure 6: **Far-Right Voting and the European Migrant Crisis: RD Event Plot**

The coefficient plot shows results from individual fuzzy RD regressions, where the share of *Expellees* is the variable of interest instrumented with the *US Zone* indicator. The dependent variable is the municipality vote share of *Far-Right Parties* in European, federal, and state elections. Each dot shows the coefficient estimate of the share of *Expellees* (left vertical axis) from an individual regression for the election indicated on the horizontal axis. Thin vertical bars represent confidence intervals based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Each estimation is a spatial RD regression controlling for latitude and longitude and allowing for segment-specific fixed effects as well as differing linear slopes on both sides of the cut-off. The sample bandwidth is 30 km. The orange bars in the background represent current salience of immigration measured by the share of survey respondents in Baden-Württemberg who state that immigration “is currently the most important issue in Germany” (right vertical axis). The dashed vertical line indicates the start of the European migrant crisis.

This supports the idea that the European migrant crisis activated a latent difference between the regions with and without exposure to the historical migration shock. Once immigration becomes politically salient, previous local experiences with immigration have implications for the local support of nationalist, anti-immigrant parties. Under such circumstances, voters in municipalities with local experiences of that kind are significantly less likely to react to contemporary immigration in a hostile way.

5.3.2 The Interaction of Past and Present Immigration: Evidence from Panel Data

Having studied the activation of the effect with separate spatial RD regressions in the 2005–2021 period, we now turn to panel data for the 1972–2021 period. For this observation period, we were

able to compile a municipality-year-level panel data set of immigration flows and federal election results. To test whether current and *local* immigration flows activate the effect, we interact the historical spatial treatment with the current level of net *immigration* to municipality m since the last election:²²

$$\begin{aligned} \text{votes}_{m,t}^p = & \gamma \widehat{\text{expellees}}_m + \delta (\widehat{\text{expellees}}_m \times \text{immigration}_{mt}) \\ & + \tau_t + h(\text{dist}_m, \text{zone}_m, \text{immigration}_{mt}) + g(\text{long}_m, \text{lat}_m) + \sum_{s=1}^5 \text{seg}_m^s + \varepsilon_{mt}^p \quad (3) \end{aligned}$$

In addition to using municipality-level immigration, we also use state-level and county-level immigration, to capture current immigration exposure. These different operationalizations of current immigration exposure (and salience) have different advantages. Measuring immigration to the entire state of Baden-Württemberg has the advantage that it is exogenous to local political developments in individual municipalities. Using data at the county- and municipality-level exploits more variation and allows absorbing unobserved temporal variation at the state-level by adding year fixed effects (τ_t).²³

Table 2 reports the results of fuzzy RD regressions of the far-right vote share on the 1950 expellee share and combines it with information on contemporary immigration. Column 1 is a baseline specification, which serves as the starting point for the subsequent analysis. It shows a statistically significant negative effect of *Expellees* on far-right voting when all federal elections since 1976 are pooled together while year fixed effects are absorbed.

Before adding granular data on contemporary immigration to the analysis, specifications 2 and 3 split the sample into periods with low and high migration pressure. “High immigration” years denote periods between two elections, during which the share of migrants in the state increased by more than one percentage point. The other years are coded as “low immigration” periods.²⁴ The results show that the estimated effect is substantially larger in elections that are held after periods

²²This restricts the analysis to the 1976–2021 period. As we use the change in the migrant share between two elections and spatially disaggregated immigration data is available from 1972 onward, the federal election of 1976 is the first election we can consider.

²³Note that in these models, the function $h(\cdot)$ includes full interactions of the RD polynomial with *Immigration* following the recommendation by Carril et al. (2018) for estimating heterogeneous effects with RD models.

²⁴The federal elections of 1980, 1990, 1994, 2017, and 2021 are classified as elections after immigration waves.

Table 2: **Elections and Expellees: The Role of Current Immigration, 1976-2021**

Dep. var.: <i>Far-Right Vote Share</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.032*** (0.012)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.062*** (0.019)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.024** (0.012)
<i>Expellees</i> × <i>Immigration (State)</i>				-0.022*** (0.007)		
<i>Immigration (County)</i>					0.415*** (0.100)	
<i>Expellees</i> × <i>Immigration (County)</i>					-0.019*** (0.005)	
<i>Immigration (Municipality)</i>						0.236*** (0.078)
<i>Expellees</i> × <i>Immigration (Municipality)</i>						-0.013*** (0.005)
Bandwidth	30	30	30	30	30	30
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Distance Polynomials	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Distance Polynomials × Immigration				✓	✓	✓
Segment FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coordinates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Periods of Low/High Immigration	All	Low	High	All	All	All
Observations	5252	3232	2020	5252	5656	4443
Municipalities	404	404	404	404	404	344
F-statistic (KP)	221	221	220	97	91	83

First Stage:						
<i>US Zone</i>	12.169*** (0.819)	12.169*** (0.819)	12.169*** (0.820)	12.169*** (0.819)	12.161*** (0.814)	12.013*** (0.811)

The table displays coefficients from six spatial fuzzy RD regressions with standard errors clustered at the municipality-level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is the vote share of far-right parties in federal elections. ‘Bandwidth’ depicts the sample bandwidth (in km). ‘Observations’ reports the number of observations for the indicated number of ‘Municipalities’. All estimations use a uniform kernel. All regressions include year fixed, segment fixed effects, as well as a set of cross-interactions of migration and the running variable (*Distance to Border*) allowed to differ on both sides of the cut-off. The lower panel shows the results from the first stage, the regression of the *Expellees* share on the *US Zone* indicator. Columns 2 and 3 compare the effect of *Expellees* in two sub-samples: elections in periods of low immigration (2) and during immigration waves (3). An immigration wave is defined as a period between two elections, during which the share of migrants in society increased by more than one percentage point.

with high immigration. The effect of the expellee share on far-right voting is insignificant during low immigration periods (column 2) and twice as large during immigration waves (column 3) as compared to the average effect (column 1).

To study this relationship more rigorously, specification 4 interacts the 1950 expellee share with a measure of *Immigration* to the state of Baden-Württemberg. The interaction enters with a negative sign that is statistically significant at the one-percent level, showing that the negative effect is large in years with higher immigration rates. Figure 7, Panel [a] visualizes this by plotting the corresponding marginal effects: the effect of *Expellees* is zero in periods without positive net immigration and negative when statewide immigration is higher. Specifications 5 and 6 in Table 2




Figure 7: **Marginal Effects of Expellees on Far-Right Vote Shares**

The figure plots results from three spatial fuzzy RD regressions as described in Table 2, columns 4-6. The dependent variable is *Far-Right Vote Share*. The blue lines display marginal effects of *Expellees* given different levels of current *Immigration* at the state level (Panel [a]), county level (Panel [b]), and municipality level (Panel [c]) with 95% confidence intervals (shaded blue areas). The orange bars provide histograms of *Immigration* at the state, county, and municipality level, respectively.

use more detailed data on immigration to each county and each municipality. Column 5 is based on county-year-level immigration data for the 44 counties (*Landkreise* and *Stadtkreise*) that comprise Baden-Württemberg. Specification 6 repeats this exercise with highly granular data at the municipality-year level. In both models, the coefficient on the interaction is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. Panel [b] and [c] of Figure 7 again show the corresponding marginal effects. The negative effect of the expellee share on far-right voting is substantially more pronounced in counties and in municipalities that have experienced higher levels of migration since the last election. In fact, the strong negative effect of the expellee share on far-right voting is only observable in counties and municipalities where contemporary net immigration is positive.

Appendix Table A18 shows that this result holds when controlling for annual statewide immigration and its interaction with the treatment in the specifications that use county-level and municipality-level variation in immigration (models 5 and 6). This shows that the heterogeneity of the effect is not only driven by temporal variation but also by spatial variation in immigration for given levels of current statewide immigration. The effect on voters is stronger *when* and *where* there is more contemporary immigration.

5.4 Electoral Effects, 1949–2021

To study the effect not only on far-right voting but also on all other political ideologies, we extend this analysis to all major political parties and to all 20 federal elections in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, from the first election after the end of the Nazi dictatorship in 1949 to the most recent one in 2021. For each election, we estimate how the historical expellee shock has affected voting outcomes at the municipality level. We present these results in Appendix A.7 and summarize the main findings here.

For parties that represented the interests of expellees in post-war Germany we find strong positive effects in the first couple of elections after their arrival. This effect gradually diminishes in the elections of the 1950s and early 1960s, suggesting that other parties absorbed these voters. Over the course of the 1960s, expellee parties disappeared from the German political landscape. Results for the most successful German party of the post-war period, the center-right, Christian-conservative CDU suggest that this party absorbed some of the expellee voters in the late 1950s and early 1960s. At the time when expellee parties lose their political significance, there is a positive effect of the expellee share on the CDU's vote share. This short-run effect, however, washes out in the long run, approaches zero in the 1960s and stays there until 2021. The CDU's main competitors, the social-democratic, center-left SPD and the liberal FDP, are unable to electorally benefit from the expellee inflow in the short run. In the early federal elections, both parties fared less well in the municipalities with more expellees just north of the border. As for the conservatives, the short-run effect fades out in the long run. From the 1970s onwards until 2021, there are no differences in the vote shares of these mainstream parties along the former occupation zone border.

For far-right parties, there is evidence for short-run positive effects in the early federal elections of the 1950s, supporting a short-run anti-immigration backlash. In the 1960s, however, this short-run effect vanishes and expellees did not affect the vote share of far-right parties in post-war Germany until the late 1980s.

6 Mechanisms

The evidence from municipal election results that we have presented thus far demonstrates that the historical inflow of forced migrants has, in the long run, reduced local support for nationalist parties in times of immigration. Our central argument to explain this result posits that experiences with immigration can lead voters to update their beliefs about immigration in a positive way. Updated beliefs persist locally because of transmission within families and local communities and affect voting behavior when immigration is politically salient. In the subsequent section, we test observable implications of this argument about the mechanism with a survey that we designed for this purpose.

6.1 Family History and Collective Memory: Evidence from a Custom Survey

Hypotheses. A first testable implication is that we would expect individuals who made experiences with immigration in their close social environment to be more likely to become more immigration-friendly. We would also expect this effect to be stronger for direct descendants of expellees than for individuals with less formative expellee contact in their social environment, such as neighbors or distant relatives. By collecting information on voters' ancestry, we can examine the extent to which descendants of expellees drive the effect. Second, to explain the persistent discontinuity in voting behavior, we expect to see a persistent discontinuity in the number of people with ties to expellees at the former border until today. Geocoding survey respondents allows us to test this with a spatial RD at the individual level. Third, our argument implies that an active memory of the mass-arrival of expellees after World War II increases immigration-friendliness. Hence, by randomly priming some of the survey respondents with information on this historical episode we can create experimental variation in how active this memory is and examine how it affects attitudes

on immigration. Moreover, this treatment should influence those respondents more, for whom this episode is less mentally present when being faced with immigration-related questions, i.e., those without expellee ancestry. Fourth, our argument suggests that views on immigration are transmitted within families and local communities. Collecting data on respondents' home regions and immigration-related views within their families allows us to examine whether this is the case. Fifth, the argument that views on immigration only affect voting behavior when immigration is salient implies that the association between anti-immigrant views and far-right voting should be stronger among respondents who consider immigration to be a politically important topic. Sixth, by using open-ended survey questions, we let respondents explain in their own words how they would describe the implications of the historical expellee shock for views toward immigration in the region today.

Survey Design. To examine these hypotheses, we designed an online survey and fielded it in the region of Baden-Württemberg in November-December 2022, cooperating with the commercial survey company *Bilendi*. We target a representative sample of German citizens that reside in Baden-Württemberg who are between 18 and 74 years of age. 3,020 respondents fulfilled the inclusion criteria and 3,000 of those completed the entire survey. In order to maximize the sample size we tolerated a slight overrepresentation of older respondents (46.0 years in the population, 47.0 years in our sample) and female respondents (49.5% in the population, 52.9% in our sample). We framed the survey as a scientific opinion poll about political attitudes and designed the questionnaire to collect information on respondents' family history, political and immigration-related attitudes, as well as a number of additional socio-economic characteristics. Appendix A.9.1 provides the exact wording of the survey questions and lists the variables that we coded.

Expellee Contact and Family History. First, we examine whether individuals with close contact to those who have experienced the immigration of expellees after World War II differ in their views on immigration from individuals without such close contact. We estimate this association with the following specification:

$$y_i^{c,t} = \gamma \text{contact}_i + \delta_c + \tau_t + \mathbf{X}_i' \zeta + \varepsilon_i^{c,t}, \quad (4)$$

The outcome variable y in these regressions is one of six separate survey items that indicate respondent i 's views on six separate immigration-related questions. The explanatory variable of interest, $contact$, is binary and represents different measures of personal contact to expellees. δ_c represent county fixed effects of the respondent's home region and τ_t answer-day fixed effects of the day that the respondent completed the survey. The control vector \mathbf{X}_i includes self-reported gender, age, age-squared, a categorical income variable, nine religion categories as well as eight education categories.

Figure 8 plots the coefficients γ , estimated from various specifications of equation 4, along with 95%- and 90% confidence intervals. Coefficients plotted in grey indicate that individuals with




Figure 8: **Contact with Expellees: Immigration-Related Outcomes**

This figure presents a coefficient plot based on twelve linear regressions examining the relationship between expellee contact and six different immigration-related outcomes coded from survey questions. Panel titles indicate the dependent variables, which are standardized. The four colored dots represent the marginal effects from regressions that differentiate between having (1) an expellee parent, (2) expellee grandparent, (3) expellee partner, relative or other ancestor, and (4) other expellee contact such as friends, colleagues, neighbors, or acquaintances as the closest expellee contact. Indicating no contact to expellees is the base category. The categories used are mutually exclusive, with individuals who report for instance having at least one expellee parent and grandparent grouped under the “expellee parent” category as this represents their closest contact. We exclude respondents who identify as expellees themselves as the group of respondents that is sufficiently old to fall in this category represents less than ten observations. The dark grey dots represent average marginal effects from regressions that use an indicator for respondents with expellee ancestry; having no expellee ancestry is the base category. Regressors include the variables for expellee contact mentioned on the left-hand side of the plot as well as a set of control variables including self-reported gender, age, age-squared, income, nine religion, and eight education categories, as well as county and answer-day fixed effects. The horizontal bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

expellees among their ancestors are significantly more likely to respond in an immigration-friendly way to all six questions. These individuals are more likely to respond affirmatively if asked whether immigration benefits (a) the economy, (b) culture and (c) security; they are also more likely to (d) report that their region made positive experiences with immigration in the past, (e) support redistributing public spending from natives to immigrants, and (f) allow more immigration to Germany. 42% of the respondents in the sample report having at least one expellee ancestor. The colored dots in each of the six panels represent coefficients from a separate regression that differentiates between four mutually exclusive categories of the closest contact to an expellee in one's social environment. We differentiate between those who have expellees as a parent, as a grandparent, as a partner or other relative, and as another contact (friend, acquaintance, neighbor). The results show that all types of such contact reduce hostility towards immigration, but also demonstrate that the effect sizes are larger when the contact is closer.

Revealed Preferences and Other Outcomes. To mitigate the risk of social desirability bias and cheap talk in survey responses, we also implemented a lottery in which respondents could win EUR 100. Respondents were asked how much of their win they would donate to a refugee aid charity. Respondents with expellee ancestry donated an average of EUR 5 [95%-CI: 3-7] more (see Appendix Figure A21). Appendix Figure A20 displays results for additional outcomes that are related to more general political attitudes and go beyond specific immigration-related questions: self-positioning in the political spectrum, intention to vote for the far-right party *AfD*, the degree to which a respondent has a European identity, a statement about national pride, and general attitudes towards immigration. Consistent with the previous results, all coefficients for expellee exposure take the expected sign and most – albeit not all – are statistically significant at conventional levels.

Persistence in Settlement Patterns. Given that people with close contact or family ties to expellees hold more pro-immigration and less far-right nationalist views, the question arises whether and to what extent it is these people who drive the electoral effect at the former border. To test this, we geocode each respondent's home municipality (indexed by m) and estimate with spatial RD

regressions at the individual level whether there is a discontinuity in the likelihood of observing an expellee descendant among the respondents:

$$ancestry_i^m = \alpha zone_m + f(dist_m, zone_m) + g(long_m, lat_m) + \sum_{s=1}^5 seg_m^s + \epsilon_i^m \quad (5)$$

The results are reported in Table 3. There is a persistent difference in settlement patterns for people with expellee ancestry when testing for discontinuities at the former occupation zone border in 2022. Survey respondents just north of the border are 13 percentage points more likely to report having expellee ancestors than those just south of the border. This effect size corresponds almost exactly to the size of the discontinuity in the 1950 share of expellees at the municipality-level (12 percentage points, Table 1).²⁵

Table 3: **Border Discontinuity in Expellee Ancestry**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>US Zone</i>	0.134** (0.056)	0.133** (0.052)	0.134** (0.056)	0.136** (0.056)	0.131** (0.057)
Observations	1365	1365	1365	1365	1365
Linear Polynomials	✓		✓	✓	✓
Coordinates		✓	✓		
Segment FE				✓	✓

The table displays RD estimates from five separate spatial RD regressions. The dependent variable is *Expellee Ancestors*. The RD bandwidth is 30 km. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

This finding is important for two reasons. First, it confirms that the self-reported expellee measure of the survey accurately captures expellee ancestry among the respondents. Reporting an expellee ancestor is thus not endogenous to some unobserved personal traits, which we would assume to be balanced around the former occupation zone border. Second, in connection with our results from Figure 8, the higher number of expellee descendants north of the border can contribute to explaining the pattern we see in the aggregate election results.

Share of Effect Due to Expellee Descendants. To estimate the extent to which direct expellee ancestry might explain our results, we conduct a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation. Among

²⁵It is worth noting that while our observational data aggregate the political opinions of all voters in the municipalities along the border, our survey provides more noisy measures as we only have a small one-digit sample of voters from most municipalities. Consequently, we do not find significant differences at the border for other outcomes, including AfD voting.

respondents within our baseline bandwidth 30km to the border, expellee descendants are less likely to vote for the AfD, with a difference of 3.9 percentage points. Combining this finding with the difference in the presence of expellee descendants along the border, we estimate that descendants account for 31% of the observed 1.7-percentage-points difference in the AfD vote share at the border in the most recent election.²⁶ The results thus suggest that expellee descendants have a substantial effect on the observed differences in far-right voting at the border. However, this channel does not explain the entire effect.

Experimental Evidence. As a next step, we provide experimental evidence for our argument that learning from past immigration mitigates anti-immigration sentiments. We evoke potential “learning from migration experience” by experimentally addressing the mass-arrival of expellees. Prior to being asked about their attitudes toward immigration and nationalism, a randomly selected half of survey participants were shown a brief information text describing the arrival of expellees as the largest migration episode in modern German history.²⁷ These “treated” respondents were then given the opportunity to describe their views on the implications of this expellee inflow and were asked if they had expellees as ancestors, in their family or social environment. The control group received the same treatment block at the end of the survey. Respondents could not change their responses to previous questions.

$$y_i^{c,t} = \rho D_i + \delta_c + \tau_t + \mathbf{X}_i' \gamma + \varepsilon_i^{c,t} \quad (6)$$

Figure 9 shows the results of this survey experiment. Respondents who received the information treatment pointed out larger advantages from immigration for the economy, culture, and security. These effects are statistically significant at the 95% level and equivalent to about 10% of a standard deviation. Coefficients for the other three outcomes (experiences with immigration, redistribute public expenditure to immigrants, allow more immigration) are positive but insignificant at conventional significance levels. Notably, the information treatment has the strongest effects on

²⁶This exercise assumes that expellee descendants turn out at the same rates as the non-expellee descendants group, an assumption supported by the insignificant difference in indicating an abstention in the next election among both groups in our survey.

²⁷Appendix A.9.1 provides the detailed wording of the treatment block. Table A12 in the Appendix contains summary statistics.




Figure 9: **Survey Experiment: Activation Treatment**

This figure presents a coefficient plot based on six linear regressions examining the relationship between the information treatment and the six main immigration-related outcomes coded from survey questions. Panel titles indicate the dependent variables, which are standardized. The dark grey dots represent average treatment effects, the colored dots display the treatment effect by respondents with expellee ancestry and those without. Regressors further include a set of control variables including self-reported gender, age, age-squared, income, nine religion, and eight education categories, as well as county and answer-day fixed effects. The horizontal bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

outcomes that relate to expected effects of immigration and thus to outcomes that are most likely to be influenced by “learning from the past.”

It is reasonable to assume that, in the absence of the treatment, expellee descendants know more about the history and integration of the expellees. Since this was a formative experience in their own family history, it is also more likely that they have this episode in mind when being asked about immigration issues. For those without expellee ancestors, the treatment provides more additional activating information. To test for heterogeneities of the treatment effects depending on the respondent’s expellee ancestry we estimate the following specification:

$$y_i^{c,t} = \theta D_i + \phi ancestry_i + \psi(D_i \times ancestry_i) + \delta_c + \tau_t + \mathbf{X}_i' \gamma + \varepsilon_i^{c,t} \quad (7)$$

The colored dots in Figure 9 plot the marginal treatment effects for respondents with expellee ancestry ($\theta + \psi$) and those without (θ). For three of the six outcomes the marginal treatment effect is only statistically significant for respondents without expellee ancestry and not for those with

expellee ancestry. This supports the interpretation that activating the memory of the historical episode decreases anti-immigration views particularly among those respondents that are least likely to consider this episode in the absence of the treatment. The result also shows that “learning from the past” goes beyond descendants of expellees and extends to descendants of natives. In concert with the finding that descendants explain only part of the electoral effects, this suggests that the historical experience also influenced the attitudes of local native communities and their descendants.

Open-Ended Survey Question. So far, we have used data that allowed us to *infer* the implications of the inflow of forced migrants on the attitudes of individuals. An alternative approach is to *directly ask* individuals what they think these implications are without restricting their replies to a set of answer options. A key advantage of such an open-ended survey question is that it does not lead or prime respondents in any predefined direction (Stantcheva, 2022). Instead, respondents can reflect on the supposed effect in their own words.

We add such an open-ended question, in which we ask respondents to reflect on the relevance of Germany’s historical expellee experience for contemporary society, right after providing them with the information on the post-war expellee inflow. We then categorize these free text responses based on eleven categories that we identified *post hoc*. Appendix A.9.1 provides the codebook as well as definitions and examples for each of the categories. Appendix Table A13 provides summary statistics.

The results for the most important categories are shown in Figure 10. They indicate that the most common response was that this historical experience has led to more pro-immigration attitudes. About 20% of respondents suggested that this historical experience could foster greater empathy, more welcoming attitudes, etc. towards current refugees and immigrants. Conversely, less than 5% of respondents suggested that the experience yields more dislike and antipathy towards current immigrants. Furthermore, 16% of respondents noted that traumata could be a potential consequence of the expellee experience without specifying concrete political consequences. Another 16% states that these experiences are no longer relevant in contemporary society, suggesting for instance, that too much time has passed since then. Other respondents gave responses that did not include state-

ments on the expected effect (see Appendix) or indicated that they “do not know.” As one would expect, respondents without expellee contact are significantly more likely “not to know.”




Figure 10: Open Question: The Significance of Germany’s Expellee Experience for Today

This figure presents average predicted outcomes from five separate regressions. The dependent variables as indicated in the panel titles are indicators for different categories of answers coded from an open survey question on the meaning of Germany’s expellee experience for today. Regressors consist of the variable for expellee contact as well as a set of control variables including self-reported gender, age, age-squared, income, nine religion, and eight education categories, as well as county and answer-day fixed effects. The horizontal bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

Transmission Across Generations. Our argument implies that attitudes persist locally because they are transmitted across generations. Results in Appendix Table A14 show a strong relationship between respondents’ attitudes towards immigration and those of their parents. This link tends to be more pronounced for older respondents and for those who live in the same region as their ancestors. Moreover, 50.3% of survey participants indicate that they live within 20 kilometers of their ancestors’ home.

The Role of Immigration Salience. Finally, two additional findings underline the relevance of immigration-related attitudes for actual voting behavior. First, negative attitudes towards immigration strongly predict AfD voting, as shown in Appendix Table A15.²⁸ Second, the association between anti-immigration view and far-right voting is substantially stronger for respondents who consider the topic of immigration as particularly important (see Figure A19). The latter finding provides individual-level evidence for the argument that surges in immigration salience can activate latent attitudes toward immigration to become electorally relevant.

Overall, the survey results provide insights into the relationship between family history and attitudes towards immigration, and the potential for information interventions to shape self-reported attitudes towards immigration. Arguably, an implication of our argument is that local experiences with past immigration shocks must have been *positive* in the long term in one way or another. In the next section we examine whether we can detect evidence for positive experiences also in our observational data. Specifically, we investigate whether the data reflect the perceived positive economic experiences from the inflow of expellees that is suggested by survey responses.

6.2 The Positive Economic Experience

As was observable in recent immigration waves, there is a widespread fear in the societies of destination countries that immigration creates economic problems. To the extent that these fears originate from economic theory, a standard argument is that increased labor supply puts downward pressure on wages, especially for low-skilled workers. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that in many cases, migration actually has positive effects on regional economic performance, including the incomes of natives (e.g., Beerli et al., 2021; Card, 1990; Foged & Peri, 2015; Tabellini, 2020).²⁹ If positive effects on regional incomes are observable in our setting, this could contribute to explaining the less hostile political reaction to current immigration in regions that made such a positive experience with immigration in the past.

²⁸The table also shows that AfD voters are older, less educated, poorer and less religious than voters of other parties. They also place themselves more toward the right end of a political left-right spectrum and indicate more national pride.

²⁹See Borjas (2003) for a different result and Lewis & Peri (2015) for a review of this literature.

Data on Economic Outcomes. We collected and digitized administrative data on local tax revenues at the municipality level to study the long-term economic effects of the expellee shock. We focus on the taxes for which data is available for the longest time period: income taxes, land taxes, and corporate taxes. The local revenue from income taxes is the most direct measure of local incomes but municipality level-data is only available from 1970 onwards. Data on municipality-level land tax revenues is also available for 1950 and 1960 and thus allows us to observe the early post-treatment period. Municipality-level corporate taxes are also available for earlier years but they represent a more noisy measure of local incomes, because they are heavily influenced by individual large firms in individual municipalities. For the analyses, we adjust local tax revenues for municipality-specific tax factors, convert them to per-capita amounts, and take the natural logarithm to examine effects in relative terms rather than in absolute amounts.

Economic Effects. Table 4 reports the results of sharp RD regressions that estimate the discontinuity at the border based on equation 1. In column 1, we examine income tax data from 1970 to 2020 and find larger incomes north of the former occupation zone border. The discontinuity is small and marginally significant in the 1970s but becomes economically large and highly statistically significant in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, with an estimated discontinuity at the border of 9-10 percent of local income tax revenues in 2020. Moving to column 2, the estimated effects for local land tax revenues from 1990 to 2020 are very similar as effects on income tax revenues, both in terms of statistical significance and in economic size.³⁰ Data on municipality-level land tax revenues are also available for the pre-1970 period. With these data, we find that positive economic effects are not yet observable in 1950 and 1960. When calculating land tax revenue per capita (natives + expellees) there is a negative effect, suggesting that the arrival of expellees did not immediately increase land tax revenues – and thus the value of real estate property – north of the border. Positive economic effects only become visible in the long run. Results on local corporate tax revenues in the last column generally support these conclusions, albeit statistical precision is smaller. Nevertheless, the results on corporate taxes are consistent with the absence of a discontinuity in the 1950s, a growing discontinuity in the 1970s and a significant discontinuity in

³⁰The land tax can serve as a rough proxy for local incomes by indicating the value of real estate property in the municipalities. As a caveat, note that in Germany, the last re-valuation of land for the collection of land taxes took place in 1964. This is why there would be no significant changes in land tax revenues between 1990 and 2020 even if actual land value had changed differentially on the two sides of the border.

Table 4: **Long-Term Economic Effects**

Outcome variable:	<i>Income Tax</i> (per capita, ln)	<i>Land Tax</i> (per capita, ln)	<i>Corporate Tax</i> (per capita, ln)
2020	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.003)	
2015	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.020* (0.011)
2010	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.003)	
2005	0.011*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.003)	
2000	0.008*** (0.002)	0.007** (0.003)	
1995	0.013*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.003)	
1990	0.013*** (0.002)	0.007* (0.004)	
1976	0.004 (0.003)		0.000 (0.010)
1970	0.007* (0.004)		0.012 (0.012)
1960		-0.022*** (0.008)	-0.006 (0.012)
1960 (<i>per native</i>)		-0.006 (0.011)	0.003 (0.012)
1950		-0.020** (0.009)	-0.016 (0.011)
1950 (<i>per native</i>)		-0.003 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.012)

The table displays coefficients from separate fuzzy spatial RD regressions, where the treatment variable *Expellees* is instrumented with the *US Zone* indicator. The various dependent variables are indicated in the top row and measured at the municipality level. The first column indicates the year in which the outcomes are measured. Cells are empty if data are not available. Apart from the outcome variables, the specifications are the same as in Table 1, Panel C.

the 2010s. In sum, our evidence is consistent with a positive causal effect of immigration on local incomes.³¹

Alternative Mechanisms. In Appendix A.10.5, we show that the expellee shock had a persistent positive effect on population density but that other demographic characteristics such as population growth, the share of immigrants, and annual immigration levels are not significantly different in the long run. This also rules out that immigrants that settled in the region after the expellees sorted along the same border. It is thus plausible that local experiences with the massive inflow of immigrants after World War II were, in the long run, positive from an economic perspective.

³¹These results are in line with Peters (2022) and Ciccone & Nimczik (2022), who find positive long-term economic effects of the immigration of expellees to Germany.

These positive experiences with immigration, in turn, can explain why political reactions to renewed inflows of immigration are less hostile than in places without such experiences.

Only an Income Effect? The finding of the positive economic effect prompts the question of whether the electoral effect we observe is exclusively due to a general association between local income levels and nationalist voting. If so, reduced support for nationalist parties in treated regions would result only from increased local economic well-being, not from the positive collective experience with immigration. However, we find evidence against this interpretation. First, the heterogeneous effects (section 5.3.2) and, in particular, the finding that the European migrant crisis of 2015 activated the effect (section 5.3.1) go against this interpretation. As the previous section shows, the positive economic effect of the forced migrants existed for decades but the local experience has only translated into differences in voting behavior *when* and *where* it turned politically salient through a contemporary immigration shock. Second, we specifically test whether there is an association between local income levels and nationalist voting that depends on contemporary immigration. If the effect we identify was exclusively driven by higher local incomes and was independent of the local experience with immigration, we would see that locations with lower incomes react more strongly to contemporary immigration. However, we do not find this pattern (Figure A23). While higher local incomes reduce far-right vote shares overall, this association is homogeneous and does *not* depend on contemporary immigration. Richer municipalities show less support for far-right parties also when contemporary immigration is low. In contrast, the experience with the expellee shock only matters when contemporary immigration is high, which supports the idea that the local experience with immigration matters. According to this interpretation, it is this positive experience that prevents voters from shifting to nationalist parties when contemporary immigration is high, which is consistent both with results from observational data and our survey.

7 Conclusions

This study examines the long-run political effects of exposure to immigration. Drawing on a natural experiment from Germany, we show that the massive inflow of forced migrants after World War II has an impact on voting for nationalist parties more than 70 years later. Voters in municipali-

ties that experienced this historical immigration shock are substantially less likely to respond to current immigration waves by voting for nationalist parties. Current immigration activates latent differences in political attitudes toward immigration, which result from demonstrably positive experiences with immigration's economic effects. Individual-level evidence from a custom survey aligns with these results and shows that immigration-friendly attitudes in the regions that experienced the expellee inflow result from norm transmission within families and local communities. The long-term electoral effect is driven by both descendants of expellees and descendants of natives. Experimentally evoking memories of the historical experience also leads to more pro-immigration responses. In summary, our results indicate that positive experience with migration reduces anti-immigrant attitudes, resulting in significant electoral consequences when immigration is politically salient.

These results provide an explanation for the stark regional differences in political reactions to immigration. In many countries, the nationalist backlash against immigration is regionally concentrated; interestingly often in regions with relatively few immigrants. Our results may explain this phenomenon and suggest that the lack of experience with immigration in such regions is an important mechanism behind the hostile political reaction. Second, the results highlight that the short- and long-run political effects of immigration can go in opposite directions. While immediate political reactions to immigration are often hostile, opposition to immigration is more likely to fade in the long run.

We draw these conclusions from a context where the economic integration of immigrants was demonstrably successful. It is plausible, however, to expect different effects in contexts with less success in integrating immigrants. Future research could examine alternative contexts to identify the exact political, social, and economic conditions under which experience with immigration mitigates nationalist backlash against immigration.

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A.1 Historical Maps



Figure A1: The Occupation Zones in Baden-Württemberg

The map shows which areas in today's state of Baden-Württemberg belonged to the US occupation zone (light blue) and the French occupation zone (light green and medium green). The red line shows the highway A8. As can be seen from the map, none of the previously existing borders (bold black lines) of the former historical provinces of Baden, Württemberg, and the Hohenzollern Lands played a role in the determination of the occupation zone border. These regions were cut apart by the border until the state of Baden-Württemberg was founded in 1952. The three provinces that are visible in the map were created by the occupation forces and only existed in the 1945–1952 period. Source: Historischer Atlas von Baden-Württemberg (Kommission für geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-Württemberg 1972).

A.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: **Summary Statistics**

	Observations	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Far-Right Vote Share</i>	15,180	3.36	3.90	0.00	25.00
<i>Expellee Parties Vote Share</i>	4,554	4.38	6.50	0.00	47.72
<i>CDU Vote Share</i>	15,180	50.77	16.29	7.46	100.00
<i>SPD Vote Share</i>	15,180	24.97	10.32	0.00	59.50
<i>FDP Vote Share</i>	15,180	11.12	6.77	0.00	71.43
<i>Green Party Vote Share</i>	9,108	8.22	3.91	0.00	36.95
<i>US Zone</i>	759	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00
<i>Distance to Border</i>	759	28.12	17.88	0.03	59.87
<i>Expellees</i>	759	15.26	7.52	0.90	45.17
<i>Immigration (State)</i>	12,144	0.88	1.13	-0.73	3.15
<i>Immigration (County)</i>	11,385	0.78	1.30	-1.49	5.39
<i>Immigration (Municipality)</i>	8,754	0.64	1.52	-14.29	10.02
<i>Periods of High Migration</i>	15,326	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00
<i>Population (in Thousands, ln)</i>	14,567	1.41	1.15	-2.06	6.46
<i>Male Population Share (%)</i>	12,290	49.13	1.64	23.17	64.18
<i>Population Share Older than 65 (%)</i>	10,609	14.53	3.87	5.59	36.79
<i>Population Share Younger than 25 (%)</i>	10,608	32.91	5.88	19.17	55.43
<i>Catholics Share</i>	759	40.06	22.22	2.69	90.43
<i>Population Growth</i>	15,180	0.97	1.95	-27.14	27.48
<i>Annual Immigration</i>	10,626	0.17	0.74	-6.96	10.13
<i>Total Population 1939 (ln)</i>	759	7.70	1.09	4.86	13.12
<i>Population Density 1950</i>	759	182.58	196.18	22.08	2,400.41
<i>NSDAP Vote Share 1933</i>	146	45.42	12.28	13.61	73.80
<i>Area of Municipality</i>	759	30.18	29.15	1.85	207.33
<i>Distance to Stuttgart</i>	759	58.24	26.97	0.69	135.47
<i>Distance to Nearest City</i>	759	29.71	17.29	0.61	79.74
<i>Distance to Autobahn</i>	759	32.97	23.60	0.01	90.11
<i>Income Tax (p.c., ln)</i>	6,828	5.80	0.35	3.06	7.30
<i>Land Tax (p.c., ln)</i>	6,068	3.30	0.33	1.20	4.65
<i>Corporate Tax (p.c., ln)</i>	2,265	4.35	0.80	0.61	8.48

Summary statistics for observations in election years (1949–2021) from all municipalities within 60 km distance to the former occupation zone border. For variables without time-variation in our panel, we show only one observation per entity.

A.3 Definition of Variables

Far-Right Vote Share. Combined vote share of all far-right, nationalist parties (in percent). Party coding according to [Decker & Neu \(2018\)](#); [Schedler \(2021\)](#); [Stöss \(1980–1986\)](#). Data sources: digitized statistical yearbooks and online files of the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Expellee Parties Vote Share. Combined vote share of all expellee parties (in percent). Data sources: digitized statistical yearbooks and online files of the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

CDU Vote Share. Vote share of the Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) in percent. Data sources: digitized statistical yearbooks and online files of the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

SPD Vote Share. Vote share of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) in percent. Data sources: digitized statistical yearbooks and online files of the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

FDP Vote Share. Vote share of the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) in percent. Data sources: digitized statistical yearbooks and online files of the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Green Party Vote Share. Vote share of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in percent. Data sources: online files of the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

US Zone. Binary variable indicating municipalities whose territory is located in the former US occupation zone. Data sources: based on [Historischer Atlas von Baden-Württemberg \(1972\)](#), GIS shapefiles provided by [Schumann \(2014\)](#), and the Landesamt für Geoinformation und Landentwicklung of Baden-Württemberg (2019).

Distance to Border. Euklidian distance between a municipality’s centroid and the closest point on the former occupation zone border in kilometers. Data source: own coding based on GIS shape-

files provided by [Schumann \(2014\)](#) and the Landesamt für Geoinformation und Landentwicklung of Baden-Württemberg (2019).

Expellees. Share of expellees in the total population of the municipality in percent in 1950. Data sources: digitized statistical yearbooks of the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg. We matched 1950 and current municipalities based on exact geo-locations that we collected and verified using the Nominatim search engine.

Immigration (State). Change in the share of foreigners in the state of Baden-Württemberg between two elections in percentage points. Data sources: web-scraped data from the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Immigration (County). Change in the share of foreigners in a county (Kreis) between two elections in percentage points. Data sources: web-scraped data from the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Immigration (Municipality). Change in the share of foreigners in a municipality (Gemeinde) between two elections in percentage points. Data sources: web-scraped data from the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Periods of High Migration. Binary variable indicating periods in which *Immigration (State)* is larger than one percentage point. Data sources: web-scraped data from the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Population (in Thousands, ln). Number of residents of a given municipality. Natural logarithm. Data sources: web-scraped data from the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Male Population Share (%). Share of male residents. Data sources: web-scraped data from the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Population Share Older than 65 (%). Share of residents aged 66 and older. Data sources: web-scraped data from the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Population Share Younger than 25 (%). Share of residents aged 24 and younger. Data sources: web-scraped data from the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Catholics Share (%). Share of residents who are of Catholic faith. Data sources: web-scraped data from the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Population Growth. Annual change in the number of residents in percent. Data sources: web-scraped data from the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Annual Immigration. Annual change in the number of foreigners in percentage points. Data sources: web-scraped data from the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Total Population 1939 (ln). Number of residents in 1939. Natural logarithm. Data source: statistical yearbooks of the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Population Density 1950. Number of residents per square kilometer. Data sources: own coding based on GIS shapefiles provided by the Landesamt für Geoinformation und Landentwicklung of Baden-Württemberg (2019) and 1950 population reported in statistical yearbooks of the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

NSDAP Vote Share 1933. Vote share of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei in 1933 in percent. Data source: (Falter & Hänisch, 1990).

Area of Municipality. Geographic size of the municipality in square kilometers. Data source: own coding based on GIS shapefiles provided by the Landesamt für Geoinformation und Landentwicklung of Baden-Württemberg (2019).

Distance to Stuttgart. Euklidian distance between a municipality's centroid and the center of Stuttgart in kilometers. Data source: own coding based on GIS shapefiles provided by the Landesamt für Geoinformation und Landentwicklung of Baden-Württemberg (2019).

Distance to Nearest City. Euklidian distance in kilometers between a municipality's centroid and the center of the nearest municipality with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Data source: own coding based on GIS shapefiles provided by the Landesamt für Geoinformation und Landentwicklung of Baden-Württemberg (2019).

Distance to Autobahn. Euklidian distance between a municipality's centroid and closest point on the highway A8. Data source: own coding based on GIS shapefiles provided by [Schumann \(2014\)](#) the Landesamt für Geoinformation und Landentwicklung of Baden-Württemberg (2019)

Income Tax (p.c., ln). Municipality-level revenues of the income tax. Divided by municipality-specific tax factors. Divided by the number of residents. Natural logarithm. Data sources: Digitized statistical yearbooks and online files of the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Land Tax (p.c., ln). Municipality-level revenues of the land tax. Divided by municipality-specific tax factors. Divided by the number of residents. Natural logarithm. Data sources: Digitized statistical yearbooks and online files of the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

Corporate Tax (p.c., ln). Municipality-level revenues of the corporate tax. Divided by municipality-specific tax factors. Divided by the number of residents. Natural logarithm. Data sources: Digitized statistical yearbooks and online files of the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg.

A.4 Manipulation Test




Figure A3: **Manipulation Test**

The figure shows the density of the observations with respect to their distance to the border between the French (negative values) and the US occupation zone (positive values) in the state of Baden-Württemberg. This manipulation testing procedure applies local polynomial density estimators (Cattaneo et al., 2020). The border predominantly follows municipality boundaries and *Distance to Border* captures the distance from the center of the respective municipalities to the occupation zone border in kilometers. Hence, for mechanical reasons, very few observations have a distance that is quasi zero, but as a consequence, we observe a relative accumulation of distances in the range of two to five kilometers. As the manipulation test shows, this pattern exists on both sides of the border and we do not observe significantly different densities at the cut-off.

A.5 Robustness and Sensitivity

A.5.1 Reduced-Form Regressions




Figure A4: **Reduced-Form Regressions: Marginal Effects of Expellees on Far-Right Vote Shares**

The figure plots results from three spatial sharp RD regressions. These are the reduced-form model corresponding to models 4-6 in Table 2. The dependent variable is *Far-Right Vote Share*. The blue lines display marginal effects of being located in the former *US Zone* given different levels of current *Immigration*. The shaded blue areas are 95% confidence intervals. The orange bars represent a histogram of *Immigration* at various levels of observation.

Table A2: **Robustness: Reduced Form**

	(1)
Panel A. Periods of High Migration	
<i>US Zone</i>	-0.758***
	(0.228)
Panel B. Periods of Low Migration	
<i>US Zone</i>	-0.167
	(0.113)
Panel C. 2021	
<i>US Zone</i>	-1.774***
	(0.445)
Municipalities	404
Bandwidth	30
Segments	✓
Coordinates	✓

The table displays coefficients from separate spatial sharp RD regressions (see equation 1) with the vote share of far-right parties in federal elections as the dependent variable. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the municipality level in Panels A and B and to heteroskedasticity in Panel C. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Panels A and B compare elections in periods of high and low immigration. An immigration wave is defined as a period between two elections, during which the share of migrants in society increased by more than one percentage point. These two specifications include year fixed effects. Panel C focuses on vote shares in the German Federal Election of 2021.

A.5.2 Alternative Bandwidths




Figure A5: Marginal Effects of Expellees on Far-Right Vote Shares – State-Level Immigration

The figure plots results from ten spatial fuzzy RD regressions as described in Table 2, column 4. The blue lines display marginal effects of *Expellees* given different levels of current *Immigration* at the state level with 95% confidence intervals (shaded blue area). The orange bars represent a histogram of *Immigration* at the state level. Bandwidth choices restricting the respective samples are indicated in the panel titles.




Figure A6: Marginal Effects of Expellees on Far-Right Vote Shares – County-Level Immigration

The figure plots results from ten spatial fuzzy RD regressions as described in Table 2, column 5. The blue lines display marginal effects of *Expellees* given different levels of current *Immigration* at the county level with 95% confidence intervals (shaded blue area). The orange bars represent a histogram of *Immigration* at the county level. Bandwidth choices restricting the respective samples are indicated in the panel titles.




Figure A7: Marginal Effects of Expellees on Far-Right Vote Shares – Municipality-Level Immigration

The figure plots results from ten spatial fuzzy RD regressions as described in Table 2, column 6. The blue lines display marginal effects of *Expellees* given different levels of current *Immigration* at the municipality level with 95% confidence intervals (shaded blue area). The orange bars represent a histogram of *Immigration* at the municipality level. Bandwidth choices restricting the respective samples are indicated in the panel titles.

Table A3: Robustness: Alternative Bandwidths

Bandwidth (km)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A. Periods of High Migration										
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.032 (0.024)	-0.028 (0.021)	-0.042** (0.019)	-0.062*** (0.019)	-0.064*** (0.019)	-0.076*** (0.019)	-0.083*** (0.020)	-0.078*** (0.019)	-0.082*** (0.019)	-0.082*** (0.018)
Panel B. Periods of Low Migration										
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.023** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.030*** (0.009)	-0.031*** (0.008)
Panel C. 2021										
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.073 (0.046)	-0.065 (0.041)	-0.101*** (0.038)	-0.146*** (0.038)	-0.152*** (0.037)	-0.181*** (0.039)	-0.203*** (0.040)	-0.198*** (0.039)	-0.220*** (0.039)	-0.225*** (0.038)
Municipalities	229	288	344	404	458	527	587	646	710	759
Bandwidth	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60
Segments	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coordinates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

The table displays coefficients from 40 spatial fuzzy RD regressions with standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is the vote share of far-right parties in federal elections. 'Bandwidth' depicts the sample bandwidth (in km). 'Municipalities' indicates the number of observations by counting the municipalities within a certain bandwidth. All specifications use a uniform kernel and include local linear polynomials of *Distance to Border*, segment fixed effects, and latitude-longitude controls. Panels A and B compare elections in periods of high and low immigration. These two specifications include year fixed effects. Panel C shows results for the 2021 federal election.

A.5.3 Triangular RD Kernel




Figure A8: **Triangular Kernel. Marginal Effects of Expellees on Far-Right Vote Shares**

The figure plots results from spatial fuzzy RD regressions as described in Table 2, columns 4-6. The specifications are identical except that they use a triangular RD kernel. The blue lines display marginal effects of *Expellees* given different levels of current *Immigration* at the state level (Panel [a]), county level (Panel [b]), and municipality level (Panel [c]) with 95% confidence intervals. The orange bars provide histograms of *Immigration* at the state/county/municipality level.

Table A4: **Robustness: Alternative Kernel**

	(1)
Panel A. Periods of High Migration	
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.039**
	(0.019)
Panel B. Periods of Low Migration	
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.008
	(0.010)
Panel C. 2021	
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.092**
	(0.036)
Municipalities	404
Bandwidth	30
Segments	✓
Coordinates	✓

These specifications are identical to our baseline, except that they use a *triangular* instead of a *uniform* kernel.

A.5.4 Control Variables




Figure A9: **Additional Control Variables**

The figure plots results from four spatial fuzzy RD regressions. The dependent variable is *Far-Right Vote Share*. The blue lines display marginal effects of *Expellees* given different levels of current *Immigration* at the municipality level with 95% confidence intervals (shaded blue areas). The orange bars provide histograms of *Immigration* at the municipality level. The specifications are identical to those reported in Figure 7, panel [c] but add the control variables indicated in the panel titles: **Autobahn** indicates that the regressions control for second-order polynomials of distance to the Autobahn A8. **Stuttgart** indicates that the regressions control for second-order polynomials of distance to the state capital Stuttgart. **Nearest City** indicates that the regressions control for second-order polynomials of distance to the nearest city with more than 100.000 inhabitants. **Area Size** indicates that the regressions control for second-order polynomials of the municipality's area size in km^2 .

Table A5: Robustness: Additional Control Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A. Periods of High Migration					
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.040** (0.017)	-0.041** (0.019)	-0.049*** (0.018)	-0.064*** (0.019)	-0.062*** (0.019)
Panel B. Periods of Low Migration					
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.009)
Panel C. 2021					
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.089*** (0.033)	-0.094*** (0.036)	-0.116*** (0.035)	-0.149*** (0.038)	-0.146*** (0.038)
Municipalities	404	404	404	404	404
Bandwidth	30	30	30	30	30
Segments	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coordinates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Covariates	Autobahn	Stuttgart	Nearest City	Area Size	-

The table displays coefficients from separate spatial fuzzy RD regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the municipality level in Panels A and B and heteroskedasticity-robust in Panels C. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is the vote share of far-right parties in federal elections. 'Bandwidth' depicts the sample bandwidth (in km). All regressions include year fixed, segment fixed effects, as well as a full set of cross-interactions of segment fixed effects, migration and the running variable (*Distance to Border*) allowed to differ on both sides of the cut-off. Panels A and B compare the effect of *Expellees* in two sub-samples: elections in periods of low immigration (2) and during immigration waves (3). An immigration wave is defined as a period between two elections, during which the share of migrants in society increased by more than one percentage point. Panels C focuses on vote shares in the German Federal Election of 2021.

Autobahn indicates that the regressions control for second-order polynomials of distance to the Autobahn A8. **Stuttgart** indicates that the regressions control for second-order polynomials of distance to the state capital Stuttgart.

Nearest City indicates that the regressions control for second-order polynomials of distance to the nearest city with more than 100,000 inhabitants.

Area Size indicates that the regressions control for second-order polynomials of the municipality's area size in km^2 .

A.5.5 Alternative RD Specifications




Figure A10: **Alternative RD Specifications**

The figure plots results from separate spatial fuzzy RD regressions that use alternative RD specifications for the baseline result in Figure 7, panel [c]. The dependent variable is *Far-Right Vote Share*. The blue lines display marginal effects of *Expellees* given different levels of current *Immigration* at the municipality level with 95% confidence intervals (shaded blue areas). The orange bars provide histograms of *Immigration* at the municipality level. **No Segment FE** runs the baseline specification but excludes segment fixed effects. **Three Segment FE** uses three instead of five segments. **No Coordinates** excludes latitude-longitude controls. **Coordinates: 2nd Order Polynomials** controls for second order polynomials of the latitude-longitude space. **Distance: Same Slope** does not allow different linear slopes of the running variable on both sides of the cut-off. **Distance: Quadratic** controls for second order polynomials of *Distance to Border*.

Table A6: Robustness: Alternative RD Specifications

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. Periods of High Migration						
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.055*** (0.018)	-0.056*** (0.019)	-0.059*** (0.019)	-0.061*** (0.019)	-0.064*** (0.019)	-0.062*** (0.019)
Panel B. Periods of Low Migration						
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.009)
Panel C. 2021						
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.138*** (0.034)	-0.134*** (0.036)	-0.135*** (0.036)	-0.139*** (0.038)	-0.153*** (0.039)	-0.146*** (0.038)
Municipalities	404	404	404	404	404	404
Bandwidth	30	30	30	30	30	30
Segments		√(3 segments)	√	√	√	√
Coordinates	√	√		√(quadratic)	√	√
Specification					Distance: same slope	Distance: quadratic

The table displays coefficients from separate spatial fuzzy RD regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the municipality level in Panels A and B and to heteroskedasticity in Panel C. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is the vote share of far-right parties in federal elections. ‘Bandwidth’ depicts the sample bandwidth (in km). All regressions include year fixed, segment fixed effects, as well as a full set of cross-interactions of segment fixed effects, migration and the running variable (*Distance to Border*) allowed to differ on both sides of the cut-off. Panels A and B compare the effect of *Expellees* in two sub-samples: elections in periods of low immigration (2) and during immigration waves (3). An immigration wave is defined as a period between two elections, during which the share of migrants in society increased by more than one percentage point. Panels C focuses on vote shares in the German Federal Election of 2021. **No Segment FE** runs the baseline specification but excludes segment fixed effects. **Three Segment FE** uses three instead of five segments. **No Coordinates** excludes latitude-longitude controls. **Coordinates: 2nd Order Polynomials** controls for second order polynomials of the latitude-longitude space. **Distance: Same Slope** does not allow different linear slopes of the running variable on both sides of the cut-off. **Distance: Quadratic** controls for second order polynomials of *Distance to Border*.

A.5.6 Alternative Standard Errors




Figure A11: **Alternative Standard Errors I**

The figure plots results from separate spatial fuzzy RD regressions of the baseline specification in Figure 7, panel [c]. The dependent variable is *Far-Right Vote Share*. The blue lines display marginal effects of *Expellees* given different levels of current *Immigration* at the municipality level with 95% confidence intervals (shaded blue areas) based on alternatives to calculate standard errors. The orange bars provide histograms of *Immigration* at the municipality level. **Heteroskedasticity** indicates heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. **Autocorrelation (HAC)** indicates HAC-robust standard errors. **County Clustering** adjusts standard errors for clustering at the county level. **Municipality Clustering** adjusts standard errors for clustering at the municipality level.




Figure A12: **Alternative Standard Errors II: Spatial Clustering**

The figure plots results from separate spatial fuzzy RD regressions of the baseline specification in Figure 7, panel [c]. The dependent variable is *Far-Right Vote Share*. The blue lines display marginal effects of *Expellees* given different levels of current *Immigration* at the municipality level with 95% confidence intervals (shaded blue areas) based on spatial (Conley) standard errors using a Bartlett kernel with different cut-offs. Panel titles indicate the respective cut-off distances for the calculation of standard errors. The orange bars provide histograms of *Immigration* at the municipality level.

Table A7: Robustness: Alternative Standard Errors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Periods of High Migration								
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.062*** (0.012)	-0.062*** (0.013)	-0.062* (0.036)	-0.062*** (0.019)	-0.062*** (0.016)	-0.062*** (0.020)	-0.062*** (0.021)	-0.062*** (0.022)
Panel B. Periods of Low Migration								
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.014* (0.007)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)
Panel C. 2021								
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.146*** (0.038)		-0.146*** (0.074)	-0.146*** (0.038)	-0.146*** (0.054)	-0.146*** (0.067)	-0.146*** (0.070)	-0.146*** (0.073)
Municipalities	404		404	404	404	404	404	404
Bandwidth	30		30	30	30	30	30	30
Segments	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coordinates	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Standard Errors	Heterosked.	HAC	County Clust.	Municip. Clust.	Spatial (10km)	Spatial (20km)	Spatial (30km)	Spatial (40km)

The table displays coefficients from separate spatial fuzzy RD regressions. The dependent variable is the vote share of far-right parties in federal elections. 'Bandwidth' depicts the sample bandwidth (in km). All regressions include year fixed, segment fixed effects, as well as a full set of cross-interactions of segment fixed effects, migration and the running variable (*Distance to Border*) allowed to differ on both sides of the cut-off. Panels A and B compare the effect of *Expellees* in two sub-samples: elections in periods of low immigration (2) and during immigration waves (3). An immigration wave is defined as a period between two elections, during which the share of migrants in society increased by more than one percentage point. Panel C focuses on vote shares in the German Federal Election of 2021. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 'Standard Errors' indicates the respective standard error correction, where **Heterosked.** represents heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, **HAC** indicates heteroskedasticity- and auto-correlation robust standard errors, **County Clust.** indicates standard errors adjusted for clustering at the county level, **Municip. Clust.** indicates standard errors adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. **Spatial (x km)** indicates Conley spatial standard errors with a Bartlett kernel and an x km cut-off.

A.5.7 Alternative Samples




Figure A13: **Alternative Samples**

The figure plots results from separate spatial fuzzy RD regressions that use alternative RD specifications for the baseline result in Figure 7, panel [c]. The dependent variable is *Far-Right Vote Share*. The blue lines display marginal effects of *Expellees* given different levels of current *Immigration* at the municipality level with 95% confidence intervals (shaded blue areas). The orange bars provide histograms of *Immigration* at the municipality level. **Exclude Cities (>50,000)** indicates that the sample excludes municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants. **Exclude Cities (>100,000)** excludes municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. **Exclude Autobahn (<5 km)** excludes municipalities that are within 5 km distance to the Autobahn. **Exclude Autobahn (<10 km)** excludes municipalities that are within 10 km distance to the Autobahn.

Table A8: Robustness: Alternative Samples

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A. Periods of High Migration <i>Expellees</i>	-0.046*** (0.015)	-0.041*** (0.015)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.087*** (0.025)
Panel B. Periods of Low Migration <i>Expellees</i>	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.033** (0.015)
Panel C. 2021 <i>Expellees</i>	-0.111*** (0.037)	-0.098*** (0.038)	-0.128*** (0.036)	-0.162*** (0.049)
Municipalities	392	399	337	264
Bandwidth	30	30	30	30
Segments	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coordinates	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample	Excl. Cities (>50,000)	Excl. Cities (>100,000)	Excl. Autobahn (<5km)	Excl. Autobahn (<10km)

The table displays coefficients from separate spatial fuzzy RD regressions. . * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is the vote share of far-right parties in federal elections. 'Bandwidth' depicts the sample bandwidth (in km). All regressions include year fixed, segment fixed effects, as well as a full set of cross-interactions of segment fixed effects, migration and the running variable (*Distance to Border*) allowed to differ on both sides of the cut-off. Panels A and B compare the effect of *Expellees* in two sub-samples: elections in periods of low immigration (2) and during immigration waves (3). An immigration wave is defined as a period between two elections, during which the share of migrants in society increased by more than one percentage point. Panel C focuses on vote shares in the German Federal Election of 2021. **Excl. Cities (>50,000)** indicates that the sample excludes municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants. **Excl. Cities (>100,000)** excludes municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. **Excl. Autobahn (<5 km)** excludes municipalities that are within 5 km distance to the Autobahn. **Excl. Autobahn (<10 km)** excludes municipalities that are within 10 km distance to the Autobahn.

A.6 Placebo Border

Table A9: **Robustness: Placebo Border**

Bandwidth (km)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A. Occupation Zone Border				
<i>US Zone</i>	-0.758*** (0.228)	-0.167 (0.113)	-1.201*** (0.464)	-1.774*** (0.445)
Panel B. Placebo Border				
<i>US Zone</i>	-0.075 (0.347)	-0.096 (0.164)	-0.315 (0.658)	-0.837 (0.654)
Sample	high	low	2017	2021
Observations	2165	3464	433	433
Bandwidth	30	30	30	30
Segments	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coordinates	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓		

The table displays coefficients from eight spatial fuzzy RD regressions with standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variable is the vote share of far-right parties in federal elections. ‘Bandwidth’ depicts the sample bandwidth (in km). ‘Observations’ reports the number of observations for the indicated number of ‘Municipalities’. The upper panel uses the occupation zone border as the cutoff and *Distance to Border* as the running variable. The lower panel makes use of a placebo border. While the original border was defined by using the southern borders of all counties through which the highway runs, the placebo border uses the northern boundaries of those counties. The specifications in column (1) and (2) are based on subsamples of high- and low-immigration years, respectively. An immigration wave is defined as a period between two elections, during which the share of migrants in society increased by more than one percentage point. Column (3) shows results for the 2017 federal election and column (4) for the 2021 federal election.




Figure A14: **Placebo Border**

This figure displays estimates from individual sharp RD estimations. The dependent variable is the vote share of far-right parties in the 2021 federal election. The dark blue dots display binned means of the dependent variable. The fitted lines represent parametric RD estimations using linear polynomials. The light blue area displays respective 95% confidence intervals. The left panels use the occupation zone border as the cut-off and *Distance to Border* as the running variable. The right panels show results using a placebo border and distances to the placebo border as the running variable. While the original border was defined by using the southern borders of all counties through which the highway runs, the placebo border uses the northern boundaries of those counties.

A.7 RD Results by Election and Party




Figure A15: **Electoral Effects, All Federal Elections 1949–2021**

The coefficient plots show results from individual fuzzy RD regressions, where the share of *Expellees* is the variable of interest instrumented with the *US Zone* indicator. The dependent variables are the municipality vote shares of the parties indicated in the panel titles in federal elections. See equations 1 and 2. Each dot shows the coefficient estimate for the share of *Expellees* from an individual regression in the election year indicated on the horizontal axis. Vertical bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The sample bandwidth is 30 km.



Figure A16: **Far-Right Parties, All Federal Elections 1949–2017**

The coefficient plot shows results from individual fuzzy RD regressions, where the share of *Expellees* is the variable of interest instrumented with the *US Zone* indicator. The dependent variable is the municipality vote share of *Far-Right Parties* in federal elections. See equations 1 and 2. Each dot shows the coefficient estimate for the share of *Expellees* from an individual regression in the election year indicated on the horizontal axis. Vertical bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The sample bandwidth is 30 km.

A.8 Trends and Correlations: Immigration and Far Right Voting




Figure A17: **Trends in Immigration and Far-Right Voting**

The blue line represents the total percentage share of immigrants in the state of Baden-Württemberg for the years indicated on the horizontal axis. The orange curve depicts the vote shares of far-right parties in federal elections.

Table A10: **Immigration and Far-Right Voting, Fixed-Effects Regressions**

Dep. var.: <i>Far-Right Vote Share</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Immigration (State)</i>	1.369*** (0.022)			0.499*** (0.039)	
<i>Immigration (County)</i>		0.306*** (0.044)		0.946*** (0.040)	0.371*** (0.047)
<i>Immigration (Municipality)</i>			0.084*** (0.016)	0.058** (0.023)	0.051*** (0.016)
Observations	10,964	10,964	8,974	8,974	8,974
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓		✓

The table displays coefficients from five OLS fixed-effects regressions. Standard errors clustered at the municipality-level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variable is the vote share of far-right parties in federal elections in percent. The vector of controls includes the following municipality-year-specific variables: *Population (ln)*, *Income Tax (per Capita)*, *Share Male (%)*, *Share Older than 65 (%)*, *Share Younger than 25 (%)*. Appendix Table A11 shows the full set of coefficients for the covariates. The sample covers almost all municipalities in Baden-Württemberg; it is limited to the 1990–2021 period by the availability of data for the control variables.

Table A11: **Immigration and Far-Right Voting, Fixed-Effects Regressions**

Dep. var.: <i>Far-Right Vote Share</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Immigration (State)</i>	1.369*** (0.022)			0.499*** (0.039)	
<i>Immigration (County)</i>		0.306*** (0.044)		0.946*** (0.040)	0.371*** (0.047)
<i>Immigration (Municipality)</i>			0.084*** (0.016)	0.058** (0.023)	0.051*** (0.016)
<i>Population (ln)</i>	0.597 (0.373)	-0.338 (0.365)	-0.386 (0.367)	-0.945** (0.411)	-0.405 (0.365)
<i>Male Pop. Share (%)</i>	0.390*** (0.042)	0.100*** (0.031)	0.064* (0.034)	0.379*** (0.046)	0.059* (0.034)
<i>Pop. Share Older than 65 (%)</i>	0.073*** (0.014)	-0.074*** (0.019)	-0.090*** (0.020)	0.064*** (0.015)	-0.084*** (0.020)
<i>Pop. Share Younger than 25 (%)</i>	-0.062*** (0.012)	-0.017 (0.017)	-0.077*** (0.020)	-0.050*** (0.013)	-0.069*** (0.020)
<i>Income Tax (p.c., ln)</i>	4.835*** (0.218)	-0.741*** (0.177)	-0.787*** (0.173)	5.303*** (0.279)	-0.785*** (0.171)
Observations	10,964	10,964	8,974	8,974	8,974
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓		✓

The table displays coefficients from five OLS fixed-effects regressions. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variable is the vote share of far-right parties in federal elections in percent.

Table A10 provides regression-based evidence, showing strong positive associations between far-right voting and immigration at the level of the state (column 1), the county (2), and the municipality (3). Columns 4 and 5 show that these relationships hold when the different measures are added to the same regressions. Columns 2, 3, and 5 include a full set of two-way fixed effects at the year and municipality level and thus suggest that the relationship is neither driven by unobserved statewide time trends nor unobserved, time-invariant municipality characteristics. These results confirm the association between immigration and far-right voting, which is well-established in the existing literature. While previous research focused on establishing causality for this relationship, the remainder of our analysis explores causes of the differences in voter reactions to immigration.

A.9 Survey

A.9.1 Questionnaire and Variables

In the following, we provide an excerpt from our questionnaire. We print the German original text in *italics* below the respective English translations. Corresponding names of the variables that we coded from the survey answers are printed in *bold italics*.

Treatment Block

Germany has experienced several large migration movements in its history.

The largest migration movement constituted the so-called German Expellees right after the Second World War. At that time, more than 12 million people were expelled from the former German eastern territories and fled to post-war Germany (for example, from East Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania or the Sudetenland). About one in six Germans had fled at that time.

What do you think is the significance of the fact that many Germans thus had experiences of expulsion, flight and immigration? Please take a moment to write down a few keywords that come to mind first.

Deutschland hat in seiner Geschichte mehrfach Erfahrungen mit großen Migrationsbewegungen gemacht.

Die größte Migrationsbewegung bildeten die sogenannten Heimatvertriebenen direkt nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg. Mehr als 12 Millionen Menschen wurden damals aus den ehemaligen deutschen Ostgebieten vertrieben und flohen ins Deutschland der Nachkriegszeit (zum Beispiel aus Ostpreußen, Schlesien, Pommern oder dem Sudetenland). Etwa jede(r) sechste Deutsche war damals geflüchtet. Was glauben Sie, welche Bedeutung hat es, dass viele Deutsche somit Erfahrungen mit Vertreibung, Flucht und Einwanderung gemacht haben? Nehmen Sie sich bitte kurz Zeit, um hier einige Stichworte aufzuschreiben, die Ihnen als erstes dazu einfallen.

Answers to Open Question. We coded answers in eleven categories:

- Empathy Due To Past Experience
- Trauma
- No Relevance
- Other
- Do Not Know
- Nonsense
- Immigrants Now Different than Expellees
- Relevance (Unclear Which Direction)
- Dislike Due to Past Experience
- Unrelated Pro-Immigration Statement
- Unrelated Anti-Immigration Statement

(sorted from most frequent to least frequent).

Expellee Ancestry. Do you have ancestors who were expellees or were you yourself an expellee?

- I am an expellee myself.
- At least one of my parents was an expellee.
- At least one of my grandparents was an expellee.
- At least one other ancestor of mine was an expellee.
- No, I have no ancestors who were expellees.
- I don't know.

[Multiple answers possible.]

Haben Sie Vorfahren, die Heimatvertriebene waren oder waren Sie selbst Heimatvertriebene(r)?

- *Ich selbst war Heimatvertriebene(r).*
- *Mindestens ein Elternteil von mir war Heimatvertriebene(r).*
- *Mindestens eine Großmutter oder ein Großvater von mir war Heimatvertriebene(r).*
- *Mindestens ein anderer Vorfahre / eine andere Vorfahrin von mir war Heimatvertriebene(r).*
- *Nein, ich habe keine Vorfahren die Heimatvertriebene waren.*
- *Ich weiß es nicht.*

Expellee Contact. Now think about other people in your social environment. Are there people among them of whom you know that they are expellees or that their ancestors were expellees? (Please select all that apply).

- Yes, partner/spouse
- Yes, friends
- Yes, acquaintances
- Yes, relatives
- Yes, neighbors
- No
- I do not know.

[Multiple answers possible. The answers from these two questions were translated into binary variables such as *Expellee Parents*, *Expellee Grandparents*, *Expellee Partner or Relative*, etc.]

Denken Sie jetzt an andere Menschen in Ihrem Umfeld. Sind darunter Menschen, von denen Sie wissen, dass sie Heimatvertriebene sind oder dass deren Vorfahren Heimatvertriebene waren? (Kreuzen Sie bitte alles Zutreffende an.)

- *Ja, Partner/Ehepartner*

- *Ja, Freunde*
- *Ja, Bekannte*
- *Ja, Verwandtschaft*
- *Ja, Nachbarn*
- *Nein*
- *Ich weiß es nicht.*

Survey Questions on Attitudes towards Immigration and Nationalism

Immigration Benefits Economy/Culture/Security. What do you think, does immigration rather have advantages or rather disadvantages for Germany in the long run in the following areas?

- For the economy
- For culture
- For security

Scale 1-5: Significantly more disadvantages (1), Rather more disadvantages (2), Same number of disadvantages as advantages (3), Rather more advantages (4), Significantly more advantages (5).

Was glauben Sie, hat Einwanderung für Deutschland langfristig eher Vorteile oder eher Nachteile in den folgenden Bereichen?

- *Für die Wirtschaft*
- *Für die Kultur*
- *Für die Sicherheit*

Skala 1-5: Deutlich mehr Nachteile (1), Eher mehr Nachteile (2), Gleich viele Nachteile wie Vorteile (3), Eher mehr Vorteile (4), Deutlich mehr Vorteile (5).

Experiences with Immigration. All in all, what do you think the immigration experience in your region has been like in the past?

- Very negative (1)
- Rather negative (2)
- Neither negative nor positive (3)
- Rather positive (4)
- Positive (5)

Wie waren Ihrer Meinung nach alles in allem die Erfahrungen mit Einwanderung in Ihrer Region in der Vergangenheit?

- *Sehr negativ (1)*
- *Eher negativ (2)*
- *Weder negativ noch positiv (3)*
- *Eher positiv (4)*
- *Sehr positiv (5)*

Expenditure for Immigrants (inverse coding). Do you agree with the following statement? “The money that the German state spends on immigrants and refugees would be better spent on German citizens.”

- No (1)
- Rather no (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)

- Rather yes (4)
- Yes (5)

Stimmen Sie der folgenden Aussage zu? „Das Geld, das der deutsche Staat für Einwanderer und Flüchtlinge ausgibt, sollte besser für deutsche Staatsbürger ausgegeben werden.“

- *Nein* (1)
- *Eher nein* (2)
- *Weder noch* (3)
- *Eher ja* (4)
- *Ja* (5)

Allow More Immigration. What do you think, should Germany rather take in more or rather less [immigrants]/[refugees]?

- Much less (1)
- More less (2)
- As many as before (3)
- More likely (4)
- Much more (5)

([Immigrants]/[Refugees] is randomized.)

Was denken Sie, sollte Deutschland eher mehr oder eher weniger [Einwanderer]/[Flüchtlinge] aufnehmen?

- *Viel weniger* (1)
- *Eher weniger* (2)
- *So viele wie bisher* (3)

- *Eher mehr (4)*
- *Viel mehr (5)*

Left-Right Scale. In politics, people often talk about left and right. Where would you place yourself on a left-right scale, if 0 is far left and 10 is far right? Scale 0-10.

In der Politik wird manchmal von links und rechts gesprochen. Wo würden Sie sich auf einer Links-Rechts Skala einordnen, wenn 0 ganz links und 10 ganz rechts ist?

Skala 0-10.

Importance of Immigration Issue. How important is the position of the parties on immigration for your voting decision in the Bundestag election?

- Not at all important (1)
- Rather not important (2)
- Somewhat important (3)
- Important (4)
- Very important (5)

Wie wichtig ist Ihnen die Position der Parteien zum Thema Einwanderung für Ihre Wahlentscheidung bei der Bundestagswahl?

- *Gar nicht wichtig (1)*
- *Eher nicht wichtig (2)*
- *Etwas wichtig (3)*
- *Wichtig (4)*
- *Sehr wichtig (5)*

Vote AfD. Which party would you vote for if there were a federal election next Sunday?
Selection from the following list: SPD, CDU, the Greens, FDP, AfD, Die Linke, A different party,
I would not vote, Prefer not to specify.

Welche Partei würden Sie wählen, wenn am kommenden Sonntag Bundestagswahl wäre?
Auswahl aus Liste: SPD, CDU, Bündnis90/Die Grünen, FDP, AfD, Die LINKE, Eine andere
Partei, Ich würde nicht wählen, Möchte ich nicht angeben.

European Identity. How strongly do you feel associated with...

- Your Region
- Germany
- Europe

(Scale 1-5)

Wie stark fühlen Sie sich verbunden mit...

- *Ihrer Region*
- *Deutschland*
- *Europa*

(Skala 1-5)

More National Pride. Do you agree with the following statement? “Germany should finally have the courage to have a stronger national sentiment again.”

- No (1)
- Rather no (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Rather yes (4)
- Yes (5)

Stimmen Sie der folgenden Aussage zu?

„Deutschland sollte endlich wieder mehr Mut zu einem stärkeren Nationalgefühl haben.“

- *Nein (1)*
- *Eher nein (2)*
- *Weder noch (3)*
- *Eher ja (4)*
- *Ja (5)*

Pro-Immigration Views. What is your attitude towards immigration? How do you rate your parents' attitudes?

1-10 scale, from disapproving to approving.

Wie ist Ihre Einstellung zu Einwanderung? Wie schätzen Sie die Einstellung Ihrer Eltern ein?

1-10 Skala, von Ablehnend bis Befürwortend.

Donation. Among all who participate in this survey, we will draw a prize of 100 EUR. The winner will be chosen at random. In case you win the 100 EUR, you can decide to donate part of the prize to the German refugee aid organization “Aktion Deutschland Hilft.” (The “Aktion Deutschland Hilft” is an alliance of German aid organizations. You can find information about the appeal for donations here.) The amount you choose will be donated automatically, the rest will be given to you. If you win, how much of your winnings would you like to donate to refugee aid?

Selection: 0-100 EUR.

Unter allen, die an dieser Umfrage teilnehmen, verlosen wir einen Gewinn von 100 EUR. Der Gewinner oder die Gewinnerin wird nach dem Zufallsprinzip ermittelt. Für den Fall, dass Sie die 100 EUR gewinnen, können Sie entscheiden, einen Teil des Gewinns an die deutsche Flüchtlingshilfe der „Aktion Deutschland Hilft“ zu spenden. (Die „Aktion Deutschland Hilft“ ist ein Bündnis deutscher Hilfsorganisationen. Informationen zum Spendenaufruf finden Sie hier.)

Der von Ihnen gewählte Betrag wird automatisch gespendet, den Rest erhalten Sie. Falls Sie gewinnen, wie viel Ihres Gewinns möchten Sie für die Flüchtlingshilfe spenden?

Auswahl: 0-100 EUR.

A.9.2 Summary Statistics of Survey Data

Table A12: **Summary Statistics Survey**

	Observations	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Immigration Benefits Economy</i>	3,014	3.23	1.09	1.00	5.00
<i>Immigration Benefits Culture</i>	3,010	2.95	1.16	1.00	5.00
<i>Immigration Benefits Security</i>	3,010	2.33	0.94	1.00	5.00
<i>Experiences with Immigration</i>	3,017	3.03	0.89	1.00	5.00
<i>Expenditure for Immigrants</i>	3,010	-3.36	1.23	-5.00	-1.00
<i>Allow More Immigration</i>	3,012	2.36	1.03	1.00	5.00
<i>Left-Right Scale</i>	2,735	4.88	1.82	0.00	10.00
<i>Vote for AfD</i>	2,749	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00
<i>European Identity</i>	3,010	3.16	1.02	1.00	5.00
<i>More National Pride</i>	3,012	3.73	1.08	1.00	5.00
<i>Immigration Views</i>	2,876	5.58	2.48	0.00	10.00
<i>Mother's Immigration Views</i>	2,470	5.22	2.35	0.00	10.00
<i>Father's Immigration Views</i>	2,329	4.86	2.45	0.00	10.00
<i>Issue Salience Immigration</i>	3,012	3.53	1.00	1.00	5.00
<i>Donation to Refugees</i>	3,005	31.89	30.60	0.00	100.00
<i>Expellee Ancestors</i>	2,736	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00
<i>Expellee Parents</i>	3,020	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
<i>Expellee Grandparents</i>	3,020	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00
<i>Expellee Partner or Relative</i>	3,020	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00
<i>Other Expellee Contact</i>	3,020	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00
<i>Any Expellee Contact</i>	3,020	0.63	0.48	0.00	1.00
<i>Information Treatment</i>	3,020	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00
<i>Female</i>	3,020	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00
<i>Age</i>	3,011	47.04	15.07	18.00	82.00
<i>Catholic</i>	3,020	0.25	0.44	0.00	1.00
<i>Protestant</i>	3,020	0.14	0.34	0.00	1.00
<i>Other Religion</i>	3,020	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
<i>No Religion</i>	3,020	0.38	0.48	0.00	1.00
<i>Income Category (log)</i>	2,720	7.60	0.47	5.80	8.74
<i>Lower Sec. Education (Hauptschule)</i>	3,020	0.06	0.25	0.00	1.00
<i>Intermed. Sec. Education (Realschule)</i>	3,020	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
<i>Completed Vocational Training</i>	3,020	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
<i>High School Education (Abitur)</i>	3,020	0.11	0.32	0.00	1.00
<i>Polytechnic Degree</i>	3,020	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
<i>University Degree</i>	3,020	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00

Summary statistics for the survey outcomes.

A.9.3 Survey: Additional Results




Figure A18: **Open Question: The Significance of Germany's Expellee Experience for Today**

This figure presents average predicted outcomes from five separate regressions. The dependent variables as indicated in the panel titles are indicators for different categories of answers coded from an open survey question on the meaning of Germany's expellee experience for today. Regressors consist of the variable for expellee contact as well as a set of control variables including self-reported gender, age, age-squared, income, nine religion, and eight education categories, as well as county and answer-day fixed effects. The horizontal bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.




Figure A19: **Salience**

This figure presents the marginal effects of self-reported importance of the topic of immigration on voting decisions, using a linear regression model. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent indicated that they would vote for the AfD after being asked, “Which party would you vote for if there was a federal election next Sunday?” The variable of interest is derived from in which we asked respondents to rate the importance of immigration for their voting decision on a scale from 1 to 5. Dots in the figure represent coefficients and vertical bars show 95% confidence intervals based on heterogeneity-robust standard errors.




Figure A20: **Expellee Ancestors: Other Political and Personal Attitudes**

This figure presents a coefficient plot based on ten linear regressions examining the relationship between expellee contact and five different outcomes related to political and personal attitudes coded from survey questions. Panel titles indicate the dependent variables, which are standardized. The four colored dots represent the marginal effects from regressions that differentiate between having (1) an expellee parent, (2) expellee grandparent, (3) expellee partner, relative or other ancestor, and (4) other expellee contact such as friends, colleagues, neighbors, or acquaintances as the closest expellee contact. Indicating no contact to expellees is the base category. The dark grey dots represent average marginal effects from regressions that use an indicator for respondents with expellee ancestry; having no expellee ancestry is the base category. Regressors include the variables for expellee contact mentioned on the left-hand side of the plot as well as a set of control variables including self-reported gender, age, age-squared, income, nine religion, and eight education categories, as well as county and answer-day fixed effects. The horizontal bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.




Figure A21: **Expellee Ancestors: Donation to Refugee Aid**

This figure presents a coefficient plot based on two linear regressions examining the relationship between expellee contact and revealed preference to donate for a refugee charity organization. We informed respondents that they participate in a lottery to win EUR 100. We asked them which amount of their win they would like to donate to a refugee charity organization in case they are the lottery winner. Respondents could select a value in the range 0-100. The four colored dots represent the marginal effects from a regression that differentiates between having (1) an expellee parent, (2) expellee grandparent, (3) expellee partner, relative or other ancestor, and (4) other expellee contact such as friends, colleagues, neighbors, or acquaintances as the closest expellee contact. Indicating no contact to expellees is the base category. The dark grey dots represent average marginal effects from regressions that use an indicator for respondents with expellee ancestry; having no expellee ancestry is the base category. Regressors include the variables for expellee contact mentioned on the left-hand side of the plot as well as a set of control variables including self-reported gender, age, age-squared, income, nine religion, and eight education categories, as well as county and answer-day fixed effects. The horizontal bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

Table A13: **Open Question: Meaning of Germany’s Expellee Experience for Today?**

	Observations	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Leads to Pro-Immigration Attitudes</i>	3,020	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
<i>Leads to Traumata</i>	3,020	0.16	0.36	0.00	1.00
<i>Has No Relevance</i>	3,020	0.16	0.36	0.00	1.00
<i>Other</i>	3,020	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00
<i>Do Not Know</i>	3,020	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00
<i>Nonsense</i>	3,020	0.07	0.25	0.00	1.00
<i>Today’s Immigration is Different</i>	3,020	0.07	0.25	0.00	1.00
<i>Is Relevant (But Direction Unclear)</i>	3,020	0.05	0.22	0.00	1.00
<i>Leads to Anti-Immigration Attitudes</i>	3,020	0.04	0.19	0.00	1.00
<i>Unrelated Pro-Immigration Statement</i>	3,020	0.03	0.17	0.00	1.00
<i>Unrelated Anti-Immigration Statement</i>	3,020	0.03	0.16	0.00	1.00

Summary statistics for the responses in the open-ended question about the meaning of Germany’s historical expellee experience for today, classified in eleven non-exclusive categories.

Table A14: **Transmission of Immigration Views in Families**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Mother's Immigration Views</i>	0.656*** (0.019)	0.418*** (0.032)	0.358*** (0.050)	0.476*** (0.061)	0.636*** (0.026)
<i>Father's Immigration Views</i>		0.320*** (0.030)	0.339*** (0.049)		
<i>Age</i>	-0.055*** (0.018)	-0.056*** (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.030)	-0.082*** (0.020)	
<i>Mother's Immigration Views</i> × <i>Age</i>				0.004*** (0.001)	
<i>Lives in Same Region as Ancestors</i>					-0.504** (0.233)
<i>Mother's Immigr. Views</i> × <i>Lives in Same Region</i>					0.064* (0.038)
Observations	2451	2252	905	2451	2314
Adjusted R-squared	0.417	0.470	0.409	0.420	0.421

This table shows the coefficients from OLS fixed-effects regressions. The dependent variable is a respondent's own views on immigration on a scale from one (very negative) to ten (very positive). *Mother's Immigration Views* and *Father's Immigration Views* are assessed on the same scale. All regressions include age, age squared, gender, and indicators for the respondent's level of education as control variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A15: Determinants of AfD Vote

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Socio-Economic Background	Views on Immigration	Political Ideology
<i>Female</i>	-0.017 (0.013)		
<i>Age</i>	0.014*** (0.002)		
<i>Age²</i>	-0.000*** (0.000)		
<i>Education</i>	-0.009** (0.004)		
<i>Income Category (log)</i>	-0.034** (0.015)		
<i>Catholic</i>	-0.026 (0.016)		
<i>Protestant</i>	-0.040** (0.018)		
<i>Other Religion</i>	0.005 (0.018)		
<i>Immigration Background</i>	-0.022 (0.016)		
<i>Immigration Benefits Economy</i>		-0.034*** (0.008)	
<i>Immigration Benefits Culture</i>		-0.016** (0.007)	
<i>Immigration Benefits Security</i>		-0.015* (0.008)	
<i>Expenditure for Immigrants</i>		-0.012** (0.006)	
<i>Allow More Immigration</i>		-0.018** (0.009)	
<i>Issue Salience</i>		0.063*** (0.006)	
<i>Pro-Immigration Views</i>		-0.018*** (0.004)	
<i>Left-Right Ideology</i>			0.039*** (0.004)
<i>More National Pride</i>			0.053*** (0.006)
Observations	2520	2643	2555
Adjusted R ²	0.014	0.219	0.114

The table displays coefficients from three OLS regressions. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of AfD voting. The omitted religion category is “No Religion”/“Prefer not to report.” Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

A.10 Additional Results on Channels

A.10.1 Relative Electoral Success

Table A16: **Relative Electoral Success**

	(1)
Panel A. Periods of High Migration	
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.007** (0.003)
Panel B. Periods of Low Migration	
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.006 (0.004)
Panel C. 2021	
<i>Expellees</i>	-0.013*** (0.004)
Municipalities	404
Bandwidth	30
Segments	✓
Coordinates	✓

The dependent variable is $\log(\text{Relative Far-Right Vote Share})$ (vote share relative to the state average result of the far right per election). Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the municipality level in Panels A and B and heteroskedasticity-robust in Panels C. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.




Figure A22: **Relative Electoral Success (Within-Election Comparison)**

The figure plots results from two OLS regressions. The dependent variable is $\log(\text{Relative Far-Right Vote Share})$ (vote share relative to the state average result of the far right per election). The blue lines display marginal effects of *Expellees* given different levels of current *Immigration* at the county level (Panel [a]) and municipality level (Panel [b]) with 95% confidence intervals (shaded blue areas). The orange bars provide histograms of *Immigration* at county and municipality level, respectively.

A.10.2 Interaction of Immigration and Income

Table A17: Elections and Income Tax: The Role of Current Immigration, 1976-2021

Dep. var.: <i>Far-Right Vote Share</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Income Tax (p.c., ln)</i>	-0.633***	-0.611***	-0.678***	-0.638***	-0.597***	-0.678***
	(0.130)	(0.111)	(0.209)	(0.118)	(0.120)	(0.146)
<i>Income Tax (p.c., ln) × Immigration (State)</i>				0.009		
				(0.095)		
<i>Immigration (County)</i>					0.535	
					(0.496)	
<i>Income Tax (p.c., ln) × Immigration (County)</i>					-0.110	
					(0.087)	
<i>Immigration (Municipality)</i>						0.163
						(0.339)
<i>Income Tax (p.c., ln) × Immigration (Municip.)</i>						-0.032
						(0.060)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Periods of Low/High Immigration	All	Low	High	All	All	All
Observations	9896	6596	3300	9896	9896	8066
Municipalities	1101	1101	1100	1101	1101	932

The dependent variable is the vote share of far-right parties in federal elections. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the municipality level in parentheses. The specifications mirror those reported in Table 2 but look at the interaction of local income levels and contemporary immigration.




Figure A23: Marginal Effects of Income on Far-Right Vote Shares Depending on Immigration

The figure plots results from three OLS regressions. The dependent variable is *Far-Right Vote Share*. The blue lines display marginal effects of *Income Tax* (*p.c.*, *ln*) given different levels of current *Immigration* at the state level (Panel [a]), county level (Panel [b]), and municipality level (Panel [c]) with 95% confidence intervals (shaded blue areas). Table A17 in the appendix reports the regression output. The orange bars provide histograms of *Immigration* at the state, county, and municipality level, respectively.

A.10.3 Isolating Cross-Municipality Variation of Immigration in Given Years

Table A18: **Elections and Expellees – Spatial and Temporal Variation in Immigration**

Dep. var.: <i>Far-Right Vote Share</i>	(1)	(2)
<i>US Zone</i>	-0.278**	-0.255**
	(0.124)	(0.123)
<i>US Zone × Immigration (State)</i>	0.168	-0.100
	(0.185)	(0.113)
<i>Immigration (County)</i>	0.301***	
	(0.109)	
<i>US Zone × Immigration (County)</i>	-0.469**	
	(0.192)	
<i>Immigration (Municipality)</i>		0.113*
		(0.064)
<i>US Zone × Immigration (Municipality)</i>		-0.152*
		(0.091)
Bandwidth	30	30
Year FE	✓	✓
Lin. Polynomials	✓	✓
Lin. Polynomials x Migration	✓	✓
Segment FE	✓	✓
Coordinates	✓	✓
Observations	5252	4182
Municipalities	404	344

The table displays coefficients from two spatial sharp RD regressions with standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variable is the vote share of far-right parties in federal elections. ‘Bandwidth’ depicts the sample bandwidth (in km). ‘Observations’ reports the number of observations for the indicated number of ‘Municipalities’. All estimations use a uniform kernel. All regressions include year fixed, segment fixed effects, as well as a full set of cross-interactions of segment fixed effects, migration, and the running variable (*Distance to Border*) allowed to differ on both sides of the cut-off.

A.10.4 Income Taxes and Household Incomes




Figure A24: **Income Tax**

The figure shows the correlation of county-level income tax revenues and mean household incomes.

A.10.5 Demographic Effects

Demographic Effects. To examine alternative channels, we test whether there is evidence for long-term effects on the demography of the municipalities. Table A19 looks at population density, population growth, the share of women, the share of immigrants, annual immigration rates, the share of people over the age of 65 and the share of catholics. We find that the forced migrants' effect on local population density persists in the long run for a period of more than 75 years.³² Other than that, there is no evidence for long-lasting effects on other demographic characteristics of the municipalities.

Table A19: **Long-Term Demographic Effects**

Outcome variable:	<i>Population Density</i>	<i>Population Growth</i>	<i>Immigrants Share</i>	<i>Annual Immigration</i>	<i>Elderly Share</i>	<i>Catholics Share</i>
2020	0.027*** (0.009)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.050 (0.066)	-0.003 (0.011)	0.035 (0.036)	0.251 (0.216)
2015	0.027*** (0.009)	0.006 (0.017)	0.032 (0.064)	-0.003 (0.012)		
2010	0.027*** (0.009)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.092)	0.002 (0.010)		
2005	0.027*** (0.009)	0.003 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.136)	-0.001 (0.011)		
2000	0.028*** (0.009)	0.030* (0.018)	-0.019 (0.185)	0.002 (0.011)		
1995	0.026*** (0.009)	0.031 (0.022)	-0.076 (0.234)	0.004 (0.012)		
1990	0.027*** (0.009)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.091 (0.279)	-0.005 (0.012)		
1976	0.028*** (0.010)	0.002 (0.024)	-0.038 (0.424)	-0.002 (0.014)		
1970	0.025*** (0.010)	0.090*** (0.034)	-0.082 (0.485)			
1950	0.020** (0.008)	0.077*** (0.007)				

The table displays coefficients from separate fuzzy spatial RD regressions. The treatment variable is the 1950 share of expellees per municipality in percent. The various dependent variables are indicated in the top row and measured at the municipality level. The first column indicates the year in which the outcomes are measured. Cells are empty if data are not available. Apart from the outcome variables, the specifications are the same as before. Note that for some variables values for 2020 are not yet available; in this case the most recent values are used. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

³²Schumann (2014) identified this persistence until the 1970s.

A.10.6 Effects on a Pro-Immigration Party: The Greens

Symmetry of the Effect. So far, we have studied voter reactions with regards to nationalist, *anti-immigration* parties and found that exposure to past immigration *reduces* support for them under the condition of current immigration. As an extension of our argument, we examine its “symmetry” and test whether exposure to past immigration, under the condition of current immigration, *increases* support for *pro-immigration* parties. Following expert surveys on German political parties (Jankowski et al., 2022), we consider the German Green party as the most immigration-friendly German party and study how our setting influences support for the Greens. The results indeed point to a symmetric, inverse effect for this pro-immigration party. Although the results are somewhat weaker than for nationalist, anti-immigration parties, voters tended to support the Greens more in the most recent federal elections in regions that experienced the historical migration shock (Figure A25). As for the nationalist parties, the absolute size of the effect – with the opposite sign – is stronger when contemporary immigration is higher (Figure A26). This supports the view that the historical immigration shock not only reduced support for nationalism but also increased support for immigration in the long run.




Figure A25: **The Greens, All Federal Elections, 1949–2021**

The figure is a coefficient plot that is identical to the plots shown in Figure A15 except that the vote share of the Green party is used as the dependent variable. The party was founded in 1980.




Figure A26: The Greens, Marginal Effects Depending on Current Immigration

The figures are marginal-effect plots that are identical to those shown in Figure 7 except that the vote share of the Green party is used as the dependent variable.

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